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Abstract 
 
 
Optimizing Foreign Direct Investment: Attracting High-Technology Multinational 
Corporations in the Arab Republic of Egypt  
 
 
Iann Karamali, Humanities 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020 
 
Supervisor: Nathan Jensen 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide policy recommendations for the Arab Republic of 
Egypt. To justify these policy recommendations, this work surveys theoretical literature, 
examines data about the contemporary Egyptian economy, and analyzes empirical cases. 
The main findings of this work relate to Egypt’s mega-projects, which provide a unique 
opportunity for Egypt to maximize benefits from high-technology Foreign Direct 
Investment; policies outlined in this work are intended to aid Egypt attract, retain, and 
optimize Foreign Direct Investment of this type. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 At the beginning of the century, economic growth in Egypt was so robust that 
observers referred to the country as ‘the Tiger on the Nile.’ However, political unrest—and 
the period leading up to it— in 2010 stalled growth and sent the economy into a depression, 
from which Egypt is still recovering. In 2016, Egypt signed on to a restructuring loan with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which required the country to float its currency, 
prioritize fiscal consolidation, increase taxes, and implement deep structural reforms. 
Several macroeconomic indicators have trended positively since those austerity measures, 
including nominal GDP growth, deficit reduction, and reduced inflation; yet Egypt’s 
unemployment rate has been slow to decline. 
 As Egypt’s economy continues to ameliorate, the Government of Egypt (GoE) has 
announced a series of high-profile and high-dollar mega-projects. The public goal of these 
projects is to encourage economic recovery through public and private investments. The 
portfolio of mega-projects planned and underway provide a unique opportunity for Egypt 
to attract foreign capital through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). However, foreign firms 
have not turned-out to contract these projects as Egypt had expected. 
 This paper explores potential causes for the depression of FDI in Egypt and offers 
policy recommendations to attract, retain, and optimize FDI from high-technology firms 
relevant to Egypt’s mega-projects. The recommendations are informed by theory, data, and 
empirical analysis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW OF FDI THEORY 
 
1.1 Definitions and Modes of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) primarily occurs when an enterprise of one 
country establishes a lasting interest in another host country by means of a greenfield 
investment, brownfield investment, or joint venture (JV) (Raff, Ryan, & Stähler, 2006). 
FDI comprises both the establishing transaction and all of the subsequent capital 
transactions between the foreign direct investor and the foreign direct investment enterprise 
(Duce & España, 2003; OECD BMD4, 2008). 
The first mode, greenfield investments, requires the foreign direct investor, usually 
a multinational corporation (MNC) , to establish business operations in the host country by 
creating a new wholly‐owned affiliate or asset (Moran, 2012; Görg, 2000)—an MNC is a 
firm that controls and manages production establishments in at least two countries (Caves, 
1996). The subsidiary, associate, or branch created by greenfield investments often take 
the form of new production facilities, plants, office spaces, and distribution centers, but are 
not limited to these enterprises so long as the new venture has a significant degree of 
influence on the management of the direct investment enterprise (Duce & España, 2003; 
Segal, 2019).  
An MNC may choose this mode of FDI primarily for the autonomy of construction 
and execution. That is, investment towards a new facility allows a firm the design 
flexibility to meet efficiency needs and maintain high-levels of control over business 
operations, quality of manufacturing and/or services, brand images, and staffing and 
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employment allowances (Segal, 2019; Cooperate Finance Institute [CFI], n.d.). A new 
facility could represent advantages to foreign direct investors through lower maintenance 
costs of capital assets, the ability to publicize new operations, and the ability to attract talent 
and labor (Segal, 2019). Greenfield investments also give the foreign direct investor the 
freedom to control pricing and market strategy, while reducing the reliance on 
intermediaries (Mavrick, 2019). Finally, the foreign direct investor may benefit from tax 
incentives for greenfield investments by a host government and/or the ability to bypass 
trade restrictions (Mavrick, 2019; CFI, n.d.). 
However, barriers to greenfield investments such as the high fixed cost of market 
entry and facility construction, as well as local-content requirements (LCR) or the outright 
ban of FDI in certain industries in a host economy, could be a significant deterrent for an 
MNC (CFI, n.d.). LCRs are “policies imposed by governments that require firms to use 
domestically-manufactured goods or domestically-supplied services in order to operate in 
an economy” (OECD, “Local Content Requirements”, n.d.).   
Moreover, firms able to pursue greenfield investment are often more vulnerable to 
significant political and economic risks, as they are often limited in their ability to divest 
from wholly-owned foreign assets (Mavrick, 2019). These risks can include issues with 
permitting, local labor, local regulations, currency transfer risk, reparation restrictions, 
natural environment, access to resources, tariff disputes, and macroeconomic instability in 
the host economy. Firms can also be subject to breaches of contract due to obsolescing 
bargaining or outright expropriation (Ramamurti, 2001). 
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To reduce exposure and consequences of these risks, firms sometimes prefer 
brownfield investments or joint ventures. Brownfield investments in FDI are cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), in which “firms [trade] heterogeneous corporate assets 
to exploit complementarities” (Nocke & Yeaple, 2008). In brownfield investing, facilities 
and some capital assets for the operation of the foreign direct investor are bought or leased 
from an enterprise in the host economy (Bayar, 2017). Similarly, firms can engage in FDI 
through joint ventures, in which firms engage in transnational strategic alliances with a 
local firm by pooling in a host country (Lopez & Esteban, 2004) – so long as the joint 
venture represents a “lasting interest.”1 
Brownfield FDI and joint ventures allow foreign direct investors to reduce start-up 
costs and time expenditures as infrastructure, permitting, licensing, and/or staffing may 
already be completed and in compliance with the host country’s regulations (Segal, 2019). 
This investment strategy allows firms to come to enter the market more quickly, potentially 
limit the firm’s losses from capital investments, and may provide an exit strategy.  
Moreover, these investment strategies can be considered advantageous to 
greenfield strategies for a foreign direct investor if that investor seeks to overcome the 
“liability of forgiveness”2 (Lopez & Esteban, 2004). In this way, M&As and joint ventures 
allow “participating firms the possibility to realize synergies” (Raff et al., 2006). 
                                                 
1 “The ‘lasting interest’ is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the 
direct investment enterprise” (OECD, “Explanatory Notes”, n.d.) 
2 “[The Liability of Forgiveness] is commonly defined as ‘the costs of doing business abroad that result in a 
competitive disadvantage for an [MNC] subunit … broadly defined as all additional costs a firm operating 
in a market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur’” (Zaheer, 1995, as cited in Zhou & Guillen, 
2016) 
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However, through brownfield investing, firms may experience buyer’s remorse if 
purchases require major upgrades and higher maintenance costs, cannot adapt to 
production needs, or incur unanticipated tax and regulatory issues (CFI, n.d.). Joint 
ventures may also limit the autonomy of an investing firm thereby potentially souring their 
operations in a host economy. 
1.2 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Eclectic Paradigm 
 
Although several theoretical frameworks exist to explain why firms may choose to 
go abroad, the eclectic paradigm—also known as the OLI Framework—“ [represents] the 
dominant analytical basis…on the determinants of FDI and external activities of 
multinational companies” (Amal, 2016). This framework developed by John Dunning 
(1997), does not put forth a testable hypothesis; rather it is an organizational perspective 
of international business (IB) that seeks to explain the determinants of the FDI strategies 
of an MNC by establishing a dynamic relationship between a host economy and the firm’s 
perceived advantages (Neary, n.d.). 
 The eclectic paradigm outlines the advantages that must be present for a firm 
pursuing a particular approach to FDI, for the approach to provide a greater overall value 
than an alternative investment (Bloomenthal, 2019). In order for FDI to be a negative 
opportunity cost (net-beneficial for the firm), the firm must identify an ownership 
advantage, a localization advantage, and an internalization advantage (Bloomenthal, 2019). 
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 An ownership advantage is a firm-specific advantage that is indicative of either a 
valuable market power or cost advantage that outweighs the cost of operation in a foreign 
economy (Markusen, 1995). The advantage could stem from a production process and/or 
product that is unique to the firm; moreover, intangible assets such as blueprints, 
proprietary information, patents, trade secrets, trademarks, brandings, and reputation could 
be considered ownership advantages for a particular firm (Markusen, 1995; Bloomenthal, 
2019). Any owned asset identified should be applicable in the foreign host economy to be 
considered advantageous for the firm (Neary, n.d.). Empirically, “knowledge-based assets 
are more likely to give rise to direct foreign investment than physical capital assets” 
(Markusen, 1995). 
 Location advantages are country-specific characteristics that provide opportunities 
for profit (Oatly, 2012). There are three primary characteristics that are indicative of a 
location advantage in a host economy: a large reserve of natural resources, a large and 
accessible local market, and opportunities for efficiency enhancements of a firm’s 
operations (Oatly, 2012). For production firms, a specific benefit—such as overcoming 
tariff quotas, transport costs, or factor prices—must exist to entice a firm to produce in a 
foreign economy rather than service that economy through exports (Markusen, 1995). 
 Finally, the firm must determine an advantage to internalization; that is, a reason to 
endogenize an operation rather than outsource that operation to another indigenous firm. 
In some cases, it may be more cost-effective, time-effective, and less risky for a firm to 
contract a local third-party to conduct their foreign operations at an arms-length 
(Bloomenthal, 2019). Moreover, the local third-party may offer a greater knowledge of 
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local markets and/or a pool of skilled-employees that can meet quality standards at a lower-
cost (Bloomenthal, 2019).  
Outsourcing in this way may be limited for some firms due to difficulties with 
licensing, information asymmetries, risk of local firms defecting, high costs of transferring 
technologies, or principle agency issues such as intellectual property or reputation 
(Markusen, 1995). These firms may have to internalize to operate abroad. Moreover, firms 
are less likely to outsource and more likely to internalize “when the products are new, 
complex, have no prior commercial application, and are produced by R&D-intensive firm” 
(Davidson & McFetridge, 1985, as cited in Markusen, 1995). 
The OLI framework dictates that all three taxonomic advantages must be known 
for a firm to engage in FDI. For instance, a location advantage like access to natural 
resources may explain why a firm is motivated to conduct business abroad but does not 
explain why the firm must consolidate its operations in the foreign economy under one 
corporate structure. Moreover, advantage factors do not necessarily need to be 
independent. Narula & Nguyen (2011) found that “the internationalization of firms follows 
a similar interaction between ownership assets and location assets regardless of their 
origin” (as cited in Amal, 2016). 
1.3 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Push and Pull Factors 
 
The dynamic established by the OLI framework is not wholly dependent on the 
host economy—that is, the MNC’s home-market factors can be analyzed for advantages 
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(Amal, 2016). A firm’s cost-benefit-analysis is dependent upon home country and host 
country conditions. Such conditions give rise to push and pull factors. 
Pull factors—the conditions that explain why a country may attract more FDI than 
another—include the aforementioned locational advantages: access to large and growing 
markets, raw materials and resources, and low-cost and high-quality labor. Additionally, 
political conditions, such as political stability, predictable political institutions, and 
executive ideology may provide credible assurances that may attract a foreign direct 
investor (Jensen et al., 2012). Similarly, the host country’s macroeconomic situation—
including, inter alia, gross-national-product (GNP), gross-domestic-product (GDP), 
openness to trade, exchange rate regimes, financial development—may also serve to attract 
capital (Hannan, 2018). Pull factors are specific to the recipient country. 
Alternatively, the home country conditions that persuade firms to invest abroad are 
known as push factors. Variables such as “global risk aversion, global commodity prices, 
U.S. (or a group of advanced economies) economic growth, and U.S. (or a group of 
advanced economies) interest rates” are typical push factors (Hannan, 2018). Moreover, 
push factors may arise from credit market imperfections, technological advancements, or 
interest rate differentials between countries (Fernández-Arias, 1996 as cited in Jensen et 
al., 2012). 
Push and pull factors work simultaneously to determine capital inflows. There is 
no obvious consensus on which factor is most salient in the determination of shaping the 
volume of capital flows (Hannan, 2018). However, because push determinants are usually 
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not controllable by host economies (Jensen et al., 2012), this paper will focus on pull 
determinants for policy recommendations. 
Understanding firms’ perspectives are important to this end. The Global Investment 
Competitiveness Report 2017/2018 surveyed 750 MNCs concerning FDI in developing 
countries (The World Bank, 2017). The survey outlines the most important considerations 
of MNCs looking to invest abroad; which can be interpreted as pull factors. 
Figure 1. 
Results of The World Bank’s survey of multinational investors and corporate executives 
 
Note. Retrieved from The World Bank, “How Developing Countries Can Get the 
Most Out of Direct Investment” (p 6), Kusek and Silvia, 2017. 
 
The results of the survey demonstrate that although many countries attempt to 
attract investment through taxation incentives (World Bank, 2017), political stability and 
security, as well as the characteristics of the legal and regulatory environment, are of a 
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substantially greater concern to investors. In this way, investment incentives are generally 
only effective pull conditions when investors are irresolute between two comparable 
locations (World Bank, 2017). The results of this study will be referenced in composing a 
policy position. 
1.4 Foreign Direct Investor’s Strategy: Internalization Theory 
 
In general, FDI is driven by market imperfections. Market imperfections are the 
result of price mechanisms failing to promote welfare-improving transactions (Oatly, 
2012). “Market imperfections in international intermediate product markets are necessary 
and sufficient to explain the existence of [MNC]s” (Eden & Dai, 2010, as cited in Buckley, 
2017).  
Put simply, a perfect market cannot exist and because the market is imperfect, an 
MNC can take advantage of their market power—e.g. technological superiority or superior 
organizational structure—to boost their profits through FDI. A common example of market 
imperfections leading to FDI is the automotive industry: a car manufacturer in Country A 
may create a production facility in Country B to bypass Country B’s high tariffs if the car 
manufacture believes that they can gain a competitive advantage in Country B’s market. 
However, as discussed in the eclectic paradigm, firms may not be able to extract 
profit from an existing locational advantage without internalizing the cross-border 
transaction. There are two main modes of internalization brought about by imperfections: 
horizontal and vertical integration (Oatly, 2012).  
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The former refers to firms that own multiple production facilities that produce the 
same good when a cost advantage exists for placing those plants under a single corporate 
structure (Caves, 1996). Cost advantages in this case are usually present when intangible 
assets represent the most critical source of a firm’s revenue (Oatly, 2012). 
Vertical integration, on the other hand, is an internalization method in which firms 
structure their transactions for intermediate goods under a common administrative control 
(Oatly, 2012). This mode of internalization is the result of the inability to write and enforce 
long-term contracts with respect to a specific-asset (Oatly, 2012). 
1.5 Host Economy: Cost and Benefits of FDI 
  
There is little consensus on the cumulative effect of FDI on development and 
economic growth of a host economy. Theoretical and empirical analyses often vary 
depending on the economic and political assumptions or conditions of the host economy. 
For this reason, cost-benefit discussions in this chapter will primarily concentrate on FDI 
effects on economies similar to that of the Republic of Egypt: Developing and Lower-
middle-income (United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2019). 
 In general, developing countries have become increasingly reliant on FDI inflows 
as a source of private external finance—as a result of FDI being indicative of long-term 
interest in a country (Mallampally & Sauvant, 1999). Moreover, FDI has empirically 
proven to be a resilient capital flow during recessionary periods (Loungani & Razin, 2001): 
a lifeline for developing economies. Although recently FDI inflows to developed countries 
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have trended negatively, FDI towards developing countries increased 2% to $706 billion 
USD (UNCTAD, 2019). 
In theoretical literature, advocates of FDI cite enhancements to technology 
diffusions, human capital formation, and international trade integration as positive 
externalities to FDI (OECD, 2002). Moreover, FDI often increases competition in local 
business environments, mobilizes national savings, improves environmental and social 
conditions in the host, and increases employment (OECD, 2002; CFI, n.d.). MNCs can play 
a positive role by shipping capital to where it is scarce, transferring technology and 
management expertise, and promoting the efficient allocation of resources in the global 
economy (Oatly, 2012). These effects, in turn, lead to the accumulation of capital and 
economic growth in a host economy (OECD, 2002). 
Opponents of FDI are less optimistic of the role of MNCs. Believing instead that 
the introduction of foreign MNCs may crowd out local capital, reduce the total available 
capital, drive local firms out of business, maintain tight control over their technology, 
repatriate their profits, and push for deregulation (CFI, n.d.; Oatly, 2012). 
 Empirical literature suggests that the overall impact of FDI on an economy may be 
dependent on the foreign firms’ mode of entry. The following table summarizes the 
conclusions of prominent literature on the subject of FDI economic impact. Primary 
indicators of economic effects include economic growth (EG), income inequality (IE), and 
overall productivity. 
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Table 1. 
Literature Review of empirical studies on the relative economic impact of FDI 
Author(s) of Study Study 
Period 
Effect of Greenfield Investing 
in Developing Countries 
Effect of Brownfield Investing 
and/or JV of Developing 
Countries 
Moon et al. (2003) 
 
1999-2002 No Data Positive (EG) 
Calderón et al. (2004) 
 
1978-2001 No Significant Effect (EG) No Significant Effect (EG) 
Wang and Wong (2009) 
 
1987-2001 Positive (EG) Negative (EG) 
Neto et al. (2010) 
 
1996-2006 Positive (EG) No Significant Effect (EG) 
Zhuang and Griffith (2013) 
 
1990-2009 Positive (IE) No Significant Effect (IE) 
Ashraf et al. (2015) 
 
2003-2011 No Significant Effect (Productivity) No Significant Effect (Productivity) 
Harms and Meon (2014) 
 
1987-2005 Positive (EG) No Significant Effect (EG) 
Luu (2016) 
 
2003-2004 Positive (EG) Positive (EG) 
Zvezdanović-Lobanova et al. 
(2016) 
 
2000-2014 No Data Negative (EG, current period) 
Positive (EG, lagged) 
Note. Created from “Greenfield and Brownfield Investments and Economic Growth: 
Evidence from Central and Eastern European Union Countries” (p 20-21), Y. Bayar, 
2017 
 
The summary of conclusions in Table 1 reveals that greenfield investment in 
developing countries generally has a net positive effect on economic growth at the very 
least. Whereas, indicators for Brownfield investing are non-conclusive or contradictory. 
These studies may imply that greenfield investing is a preferable form of FDI for 
developing countries seeking economic benefits on a macro level.  A more thorough 
description of each study is described in Bayar’s Literature Review. Additionally, it is the 
general consensus of literature that “greenfield investments have significantly higher 
positive effects on the employment rate than the brownfield ones” (Strat, Davidescu, & 
Paul, 2015). 
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In general, the outcome of FDI is dependent on the quality of MNCs a country 
attracts with its policies and—to some degree—the state of the economy prior to FDI:  high 
levels of existing human capital coupled with FDI can lead to explosive economic growth 
(Moran, 1998). Positive outcomes stem from high-efficiency investments and greater 
capital inflows, which a country can achieve by improving the local investment 
environment and functioning of the market (Hausmann & Fernández-Arias, 2000). 
Moreover, the policies that benefit domestic firms—e.g. investments in education and 
infrastructure—are the same policies that encourage FDI to have positive impacts on 
development (Moran, 1998). 
1.6 Host Economy: Spillovers 
  
One of the more salient rationales for FDI attraction is productivity gains from 
spillover effects (Alfaro et al., 2000). Spillovers—like technology diffusion—are the 
results of interactions between domestic firms and MNCs. The two primary interactions 
are horizontal and vertical linkages. 
 The former occurs when domestic firms are affected by MNCs operating in the 
same industry (Li & Lou, 2019). So-called horizontal spillover—the positive productivity 
gains in this case—is the anticipation that competition and/or knowledge transfer across 
the industry will make domestic firms more productive. That is, domestic firms may 
improve their efficiencies by mimicking rival MNCs’ technologies or marketing 
techniques through the demonstration effect or hiring workers trained by the foreign 
affiliates (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005).  
15 
 
 Consider the case of a domestic firm, Firm C, in Country C which produces 100 
units of a product. Horizontal spillover would occur if Firm C were able to increase their 
production after an MNC that produced the same (or similar) product entered Country C’s 
market. One example of this effect could be if the domestic firm learned an assembly 
technique from observing the MNC, their production output could become more efficient 
and, thus, the domestic firm would become more competitive. 
However, intra-industry spillovers of this kind are not readily observed; likely 
because foreign firms lack an incentive to transfer their capabilities to domestic rivals 
(Rand, 2015). Moreover, the pursuit of horizontal spillovers runs the risk that foreign firms 
may outcompete and drive domestic firms out of business (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005). 
The challenge for researchers “lies in disentangling the positive impact of knowledge flows 
from the potentially negative short run effect an increase in competitive pressures…on 
domestic firms” (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005). 
Vertical spillovers, on the other hand, emerge from linkages between domestic and 
foreign firms across different stages of production (Rand, 2015). With respect to case 
above, vertical spillover would occur if instead of an MNC entering Country C to compete 
with Firm C, it used Firm’s C product in its own production; thus, requiring Firm C to 
boost their output from 100 units to 200 units. 
Javorcik & Spatareanu (2005) identify three primary scenarios for vertical linkages: 
cherry-picking, productivity shock, and improved performance to meet demand. 
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Negligible spillovers result from the first scenario. In this case, MNCs award 
contracts to domestic firms with sufficient preexisting sophistication (Javorcik & 
Spatareanu, 2005); thus minimizing the disruption to the status-quo. Alternatively, 
domestic firms may experience a productivity shock by increasing their efficiency and 
output capabilities to meet an MNC’s demand and vie for contracts (Javorcik & 
Spatareanu, 2005). Finally, vertical spillovers may be derived from improved performance 
in domestic suppliers of an MNC; resulting from higher quality requirements imposed by 
the MNC or support from foreign customers (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005). A permutation 
of these three scenarios may also occur (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005). 
Evidence for the existence of vertical spillovers is more apparent than that of 
horizontal (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005). Moreover, vertical spillovers account for MNCs 
having effects both upstream and downstream of their respective industries. The orientation 
“from foreign firms to domestic suppliers” is known as backward linkages—with the 
contrary orientation being forward (Rand, 2016). Industry linkages discussed thus far can 
be visualized in the following figure: 
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Figure 2. 
Flowchart of spillover relationships: Horizontal, Backwards, and Forwards 
 
Note. Retrieved from “Horizontal or Backward? FDI Spillovers, Input-Output Table 
Industry Aggregation” (p.4), Lenaerts & Merlevede, 2012. 
  
Furthermore, these linkages may have varying effects across different industries 
dependent on technological levels; “with negative horizontal effects are particularly 
prominent in low technology sectors” (Jeon et al., 2013). However, empirical studies often 
admit that observations of spillover effects are difficult, inconclusive, and time-varying. 
Yet, the consensus among scholars seems to be that “the role of foreign MNEs in bringing 
local suppliers up‐to‐date with best practices should be counted amongst the policy benefits 
when judging whether it is appropriate to provide policy incentives to FDI” (Wang & Zhao, 
2008). Also implying that FDI policy can be optimized by targeting specific types of FDI 
(Wang & Zhao, 2008).  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CONTEMPORARY EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 
 
 
2.1 Egypt and the IMF 
 
 The contemporary economic climate of Egypt is significantly dependent upon the 
legacy of the 2016 International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan agreement. The immediate 
priorities of the agreement were the restoration of macroeconomic stability and the 
circumvention of an impending crisis (IMF News, 2019). Its implications, however, 
reached far beyond those initial priorities and continue to resonate across economic strata. 
 The IMF loan agreement took aim at addressing Egypt’s underlying vulnerabilities 
that largely stemmed from the 2008 international financial crisis and the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution (IMF News, 2019). These vulnerabilities included: 
an overvalued exchange rate (and the corresponding rise of a parallel, or black 
market, exchange rate); foreign exchange scarcity, which severely undermined 
private sector activity; a dramatic drop in foreign exchange reserves; large fiscal 
deficits; and a high level of public debt (Momani, 2018). 
However, prior to the loan agreement, Egypt attempted several significant 
structural reforms with inconsistent implementation and various degrees of success (IMF 
News, 2019). In fact, the failure of these government-led reforms to reduce poverty, 
decrease unemployment, address inequality, and limit corruption fueled the political 
opposition to the Hosni Mubarak government in 2011 (Momani, 2018). 
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Moreover, the Egyptian revolution and its subsequent political transition—in 
tandem with underlying structural challenges, reduced tourism, and lessened income from 
the Suez Canal—further exacerbated macroeconomic imbalances (Lagarde, 2016; 
Momani, 2018). In response, Egyptian authorities initiated policy adjustment measures in 
2014/15. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), for their part, “devalued the Egyptian Pound 
(EGP) by 5 percent and increased interest rates to contain inflationary pressures” (Lagarde, 
2016). Meanwhile, the government raised fuel and electricity prices, introduced new 
measures to gradually phase out subsidies, and legislated to replace the General Sales Tax 
with Value-Added Tax (VAT) (Lagarde, 2016). However, as momentum for the reforms 
slowed, “planned fuel price increases were deferred, income taxes were cut, the capital 
gains tax was postponed and parliamentary consideration of VAT was delayed” (Lagarde, 
2016). 
Inevitably, growth slowed (Lagarde, 2016). Egypt increased its reliance on external 
benefactors, turning to the Gulf States to finance its budgetary shortcomings and endow 
the CBE with liquidity support (Momani, 2018). Saudi Arabia, for instance, contributed 
$25 billion from 2013 to 2016, but financing from the Gulf States was unsustainable 
(Momani, 2018). The failures of the reforms and the overvalued EGP resulted in a “drastic 
reduction in foreign exchange reserves, high inflation, unsustainably high levels of public 
debt,” and an increase in unemployment (IMF News, 2019). “By mid-2016, as an acute 
foreign exchange shortage began crippling Egypt’s economy, particularly the 
manufacturing sector, Cairo formally sought an IMF agreement” (Momani, 2018). 
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In November of 2016, the IMF Executive Board approved a $12 billion USD 
extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Egypt (Lagarde, 2016). 
The approval of the program granted the immediate disbursement of US$ 2.75 billion, with 
the remaining balance contingent upon five compliance reviews over the three-year 
program (Lagarde, 2016). 
 Table A1 in the appendix enumerates the specific actions Egypt implemented over 
the course of the third review through the final review. Notable actions include: the 
introduction of a market-determined exchange rate system (currency float), adoption of the 
VAT, increases in energy prices, the reduction of food subsidies, and legislation on 
investment laws (Momani, 2018). From the table, the most salient objectives for these 
actions are improving debt management, improving labor force participation for women 
and youth, modernizing legislative frameworks for CBE, subsidy reform, improving 
foreign exchange rate management, strengthening competition, improving public 
enterprise transparency, developing capital markets, strengthening fiscal sustainability, 
improving access to land, inter alia (IMF Country Report, 2018). 
 At the conclusion of the program, the IMF was largely satisfied by Egypt’s progress 
(IMF Country Report, October 2019). In an interview Subir Lall, head of the IMF team for 
Egypt, said,  
The program achieved its key objective of macroeconomic stability, which is a 
precondition to attract investment, raise growth, and create jobs. Current account 
deficits have fallen and foreign exchange reserves are at all-time high levels. 
Growth has recovered from around 4 percent to 5.5 percent now, and is expected 
21 
 
to reach 6 percent by next year, while unemployment has fallen below 9 percent to 
its lowest level in over a decade. Public debt has begun to decline and inflation has 
fallen steadily—on track to reach single-digits by next year. This sets the stage for 
broader reforms, such as improving the business climate, which can lead to higher 
private sector-led investment and job creation (IMF News, 2019). 
 
The IMF’s final review, however, stated that given the fast-increasing number of 
job seekers, a reduction in the reform’s momentum would depress potential growth and 
output, while increasing pressure on unemployment (Saba, 2019). Since then, the IMF has 
also reclassified Egypt’s currency regime from “floating” to “other managed arrangement” 
to reflect the EGP’s reduction in volatility and the periodic intervention on behalf of the 
CBE (Sivabalan, 2019). 
For its part, Egypt seems to have turned down a new loan agreement with the IMF 
(Awad, 2020)—although there seems to be conflicting reports as to whether a new loan 
arrangement was to be negotiated in the first place. As of February 2020, Egypt and the 
IMF are discussing other support methods; including, a “Stand-By Arrangement” (SBA) 
for emergency financing and a “Policy Coordination Instrument” (PCI)—a consulting tool 
provided by the IMF (Awad, 2020; IMF Factsheet, 2020). “In the event that neither of the 
two previous programs is agreed upon, the IMF could initiate post-program monitoring” 
(Uma Ramakrishnan as cited in Awad, 2020). 
 
2.2 Contemporary Egyptian Economy: Macro-Economy and FDI 
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Analysts praised Egypt for its economic reforms (Saba, 2019). With gains of 5.6 
percent in the previous fiscal year (FY), growth of 5.8 percent in the current FY, and an 
expectation of a similar increase in the years to follow, Egypt has become one of the fastest 
growing economies in its region (Saba, 2019; Werr, 2020). 
 Indeed, in the wake of the IMF reforms, most macroeconomic indicators are 
trending positively. For instance, Egypt’s external debt fell to 32 percent of its GDP, 
compared to the 42 percent average for most of its emerging peers (Shams El Din, 2019). 
Moreover, Egypt’s inflation is near an all-time low, while “foreign currency reserves are 
booming and the stock market is 62% bigger than its post-float low” (Sivabalan, 2019). 
 These macroeconomic improvements have not gone unnoticed. International bond 
investors seeking high yields are now favoring Egypt (Saleh, 2019). Moreover, Egypt 
remained the largest destination for FDI in Africa, and inflows increased by 5 percent in 
2019 to total $8.5 Billion USD (UNCTAD, 2020). In context, FDI inflows to North Africa, 
as a whole, declined by 11 percent to $14 Billion USD (UNCTAD, 2020). 
 However, the rising tide from macroeconomic growth—especially in terms of FDI 
inflows—has yet to lift all boats. Growth in Egypt has been largely concentrated in the 
state sector, while the non-oil private sector contracted in nearly every month of 2019 (IHS 
Markit Index as cited in Werr, 2020). In fact, “non-oil private sector growth has expanded 
in only six individual months since a 2016 economic reform [program]” (Werr, 2020): the 
notable non-oil-and-gas investments include telecommunications, real estate, and tourism 
(UNCTAD, 2020). 
23 
 
 The July 2019 World Bank report warned that the state’s current business 
environment will continue to depress non-oil private sector activity (Saleh, 2019). The 
report states that future reforms “should put larger emphasis on levelling the playing field 
to allow for more private sector participation in the economy, based on fair and transparent 
rules of competition and economic empowerment” (World Bank, 2019 as cited in Saleh, 
2019).  
 Moreover, although MNCs are ramping up investments in Egypt, “the sums 
committed are still modest because public consumption has yet to rebound to pre-2016 
levels” (Mohamed Abou Basha as cited in Saleh, 2019), likely due the effects of the still-
elevated inflation rate resulting from the currency float (Stevenson, 2019). Egyptian 
officials maintain that FDI will soon ramp up and “that it is always a lagging indicator” 
(The Economist, 2019a). 
Furthermore, the limitation of FDI to the aforementioned four industries hinders 
Egypt’s ability to benefit from FDI spillovers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
vertical spillovers from forward and backward linkages in high-technology sectors are 
generally the most fruitful results of FDI. The concentration of FDI inflows in only oil, 
telecommunications, real estate, and tourism handicaps Egypt’s ability to optimize their 
FDI returns.  
Moreover, until 2016, the state also held a monopoly on the telecommunication 
industry (SantanderTrade, 2020), thus limiting opportunities for horizontal spillover as 
newer companies in the market have to compete with an established state industry. 
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Additionally, FDI in real estate is limited to joint ventures (SantanderTrade, 2020); note 
that Table 1 shows that joint ventures generally do not have a significant effect on 
economic growth in developing markets, like Egypt.  
2.3 Contemporary Egyptian Economy: Micro-economy and Unemployment 
  
Like the majority of industries, the Egyptian people also have not shared in the 
spoils of economic growth post-IMF reform. Little has improved economically for 
Egyptian citizens and some have found themselves worse-off as a result of IMF measures 
(The Economist, 2018). For instance, despite the governments virtue signaling—vowing 
to halve the poverty rate by 2020 and eliminate it by 2030—poverty in Egypt increased 
from 28 percent in 2015 to 33 percent by the end of 2018 (The Economist, 2019b). 
Moreover, it is likely that these numbers are biased by the misleadingly low official poverty 
line of 736 pounds ($45 USD) a month (The Economist, 2019b). 
 Moreover, the IMF’s planned float of the EGP was coupled with a sudden and 
lasting spike in inflation (Momani, 2018). A period of high inflation was expected from 
the currency devaluations, however, “the EGP depreciated even more than the IMF had 
anticipated” (Momani, 2018). Consequently, the devaluation gave rise to increased prices 
of basic consumer goods: e.g. sugar, oil, baby formula, and rice (Momani, 2018). This in 
turn, has led to hoarding of goods, profiteering, and increasing unaffordability of 
pharmaceuticals (Momani, 2018). Simultaneously, nominal wage growth fell below 
inflation from 2016 to 2018 during the IMF’s reforms, further contributing to grim social 
conditions and hardships (World Bank, 2019). 
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 At its peak, Egypt’s inflation rate reached 33 percent in mid-2017—falling 
significantly from then to 6.8 percent in 2019/20 (Werr, 2020). However, analysts expect 
inflation “to rebound to 7.5% in 2020/21 and 8.0% the following year”, and it is expected 
that the “currency’s strong appreciation over the last 12 months would begin to reverse this 
coming April 2020, when a $1 billion Eurobond repayment is scheduled” (Werr, 2020). 
 Moreover, unemployment provides another challenge for the Egyptian economy: 
“The number of jobless people reached 28.950 million people during the last quarter of 
2019” (Egypt's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics [CAPMAS] as cited 
in Egypt Today, 2020). To its credit, Egypt has prompted the IMF to improve its 
expectations for unemployment in the country: predicting it would fall to 7.9 percent in 
2019 rather than its initial estimate of 8.3 percent (Saba, 2019). 
 Egypt’s ambitious “2030 Vision” aims to lessen unemployment to just 4 percent 
(Egypt Today, 2020)—by 2028 Egypt’s working age population will be 80 million (Saba, 
2019). However, according to the IMF, “Egypt needs at least 700,000 new jobs annually 
to absorb its young and growing population and that can only come from the private sector” 
(IMF News, 2019).  
Additionally, youth unemployment shows little signs of ameliorating. Of the 
millions unemployed, 90 percent are below the age of 30 (International Labor 
Organization, n.d.): as of 2019, youth unemployment in Egypt has remained above 32 
percent (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis, 2019). “With increased unemployment, more 
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and more university graduates are either finding jobs in the informal sector or informal 
employment in the private sector” (Gahfar, 2016). 
 Similarly, females are also disproportionately disadvantaged in terms of 
employment. According to CAPMAS, females account for 75 percent of the unemployed 
in Egypt (Egypt Today, 2017).  
 In regard to FDI, “an important number of specialists argue that countries with 
higher unemployment rates have two major advantages in the eyes of foreign investors: a) 
plenty of available [labor] force; b) high probability of finding available work force at 
lower wages” (Blanchard, 2011, as cited in Strat et al., 2015). So, a high unemployment 
rate may not necessarily be to Egypt’s disadvantage—although there are studies that point 
to the contrary (Brozen, 1958, as cited in Strat et al., 2015). 
2.4 Egyptian Mega-Projects 
  
In 2019, Egypt finally saw a decline in unemployment rates. “Economists attribute 
the drop in the joblessness rate to national mega-projects that include the construction of 
new cities, thousands of kilometers of roads, electricity plants and bridges” (Emam, 2019). 
This is likely because Egypt’s construction sector employs about 14.1 percent of its 
workforce (Emam, 2019). Moreover, Egypt’s Minister of Investment claimed that 
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi decided to focus his efforts on construction specifically to 
create jobs for the youth (Sahar Nasar as cited in Vio, 2018). However, there is uncertainty 
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as to whether the status-quo, as is, can continue this positive employment trend (Emam, 
2019). 
 For context, not long after President al-Sisi came to power, he announced a series 
of large scale national projects that have come to be known as ‘mega-projects’ (Egypt 
Today, 2017). As of 2019, several projects have already been completed, some are in 
progress, and others have yet to break ground. The five main categories of these projects 
include construction projects, power projects, agricultural projects, logistics and ports, and 
Ministry of Transport Projects (Flanders, 2018). It is estimated that the active projects, as 
of 2018, were worth over $335 billion USD (Flanders, 2018). 
 With respect to construction, there are several high profile and high expense 
projects underway. One such project is the construction of the new administrative capital 
28 miles east of Cairo (Flanders, 2018). Construction for the new city began in 2016, and 
once completed, it is expected to house the main government departments, ministries, 
foreign embassies, a justice district, a central business and financial district, and an 
international airport (Embassy of Egypt, 2018). Egypt estimates investments totaling $8 
billion USD over 10 years (Flanders, 2018). China, for instance, is establishing an electric 
train that transports locals and goods—with a loan of $740 million USD—to link the capital 
city with other key cities (Flanders, 2018). Aside from China’s developments, the new 
capital has been funded entirely by domestic money; despite Egypt’s calls for foreign 
investment, private investors have expressed limited interest. (JLL, 2018). 
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 In addition to this massive undertaking, Egypt is also planning the construction of 
three other cities: “the New Ismailia City, the New Alamein City, and an integrated City at 
Al-Galala, East Port Said City” (Embassy of Egypt, 2018). Each project boasts its own 
strategic vision. The city at Al-Galala, for instance, “is rich in natural resources and 
development projects are underway to support investment opportunities in mining and 
construction material industries” (Flanders, 2018). 
Moreover, Egypt has undertaken, or plans to undertake, several substantial energy 
and power projects. Since 2014, $27 billion USD has already been spent developing 
Egypt’s national electricity grid (Flanders, 2018). Additionally, two primary mega-projects 
were announced to supply energy to the grid. One project already underway is the 
development of the world’s largest solar array at the Benban Solar Park in the Aswan 
Governorate (Embassy of Egypt, 2018). The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has 
supported the project with $653 million USD in investments (Embassy of Egypt, 2018). 
 Similarly, a partnership with Siemens—a German MNC—has led to the 
development of “the largest gas power generation plant in the world” (Santander, 2020). 
“The mega-project [with Siemens] includes the construction of three 4.8 GW turnkey 
combined-cycle power plants, namely Beni Suef, Burullus and New Capital, and 12 wind 
parks, including approximately 600 wind turbines” (Flanders, 2018). 
 It is clear that these projects are motivated significantly by economic development. 
For instance, the impetus for mega-projects in agriculture, such as the project to reclaim 
and develop a million and a half acers, is the restoration of significant industries in Egypt 
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(Flanders, 2018). “The agriculture sector accounts for 17 percent of Egypt’s GDP” (Egypt 
Today, 2017), but these projects are geared towards clustering other economic activity; in 
turn this economic activity leads to the creation of residential communities that attract local 
workers and foreign investors (Flanders, 2018). 
 Additionally, there are many planned mega-projects that involve the construction 
of ports, high-speed rail systems, and major roads. A more comprehensive list of mega-
projects can be found in the Flanders Investment and Trade Market Study and in literature 
created by the Embassy of Egypt’s website. 
 However, two additional mega-projects are worth highlighting. Namely, “The New 
Suez Canal” and the Suez Canal Economic Zone. The New Suez Canal project launched 
in 2014, was completed in just one year, and involved creation of an additional shipping 
lane to the canal and the widening and deepening of the existing waterways (Embassy of 
Egypt, 2018). The expansion of the strategic waterway has been claimed to double the 
canals daily capacity and has promised to substantially increase Egypt’s revenue (Embassy 
of Egypt, 2018) — “however, many analysts doubt if the new venture will deliver the 
anticipated benefits” (BBC, 2015). The $8.6 billion USD project sought no external 
investors and was principally engineered by the Egyptian Armed Forces (Embassy of 
Egypt, 2018; Gergory, 2015). 
 In tandem, “The Suez Canal Economic zone (SCZone) was launched in 2015 and 
is projected to generate [$12 billion USD] annually” (Flanders, 2018). “Spanning…almost 
two-thirds the size of Singapore, the SCZone consists of two integrated areas, two 
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development areas and four ports” and was developed for the purposes of streamlining 
international investment (SCZone, n.d.). The project is expected to generate $12 billion 
USD annually by drawing investors with special customs, special tax administration 
system, and industrial projects (Flanders, 2018). 
 Unlike the New Suez Canal project, the SCZone has acquired foreign direct 
investors: “Over 80 Chinese companies have injected approximately [$1 billion USD] in 
infrastructure, and industrial and recreational projects on a 1.3 square kilometer area” 
(Flanders, 2018). Moreover, China’s state-owned enterprise, TEDA, has signed a 45-year 
investment development agreement with SCZone; while China Jushi Group has created 
one of the largest fiberglass manufacturing facilities in the world in the SCZone (Flanders, 
2018). One explanation offered for the influx of investment from China is that “Chinese 
companies may be attracted by Egypt’s free-trade agreement with the United States, which 
offers them a means of exporting their goods from qualifying industrial zones to the United 
States under a ‘made in Egypt’ label” (Sayigh, 2019). 
2.5 Egypt and Foreign Direct Investors 
  
The attraction of FDI has been a consistent and salient priority of the Government 
of Egypt (GoE) over the last decade. One of the primary goals of the aforementioned mega-
projects was the attraction of foreign capital via FDI (Embassy of Egypt, 2018), and 
reformation measures made by the IMF were largely exercises in making the macro-
economic environment of Egypt attractive for investors (IMF News, 2019). This is likely 
because the GoE “understands that attracting [FDI] is key to addressing many of the 
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economic challenges it faces, including low economic growth, high unemployment, current 
account imbalances, and hard currency shortages” (US Department of State, 2019). 
 However, as previously discussed, Egypt has consistently failed to meet its FDI 
goals. This is despite those two extreme measures—IMF loan and mega-projects—Egypt 
has assumed. Considerations of pull factors may help explain current trends: i.e. analyzing 
the criteria of Figure 1 in the context of the current Egyptian economic and political 
climate. The top six criteria identified by Figure 1 were (in order of most important to least) 
“political stability and security,” “legal and regulatory environment,” “large domestic 
market size,” “macro-economic stability and favorable exchange rate,” “available talent 
and skill of labor”, and “good physical infrastructure” (World Bank, 2017). 
 Issues related to large domestic market size were covered in analysis of the macro-
economy; issues of macro-economic stability and favorable exchange rate were addressed 
in analysis of the IMF loan agreement; issues of available talent and skill of labor were 
discussed in analysis of the micro-economy; and good physical infrastructure was 
considered in analysis of mega-projects. To varying degrees, the majority of these 
indicators conclude to be favorable for Egypt in terms of FDI attraction. That is, a foreign 
direct investor ought to see Egypt with the lens: substantial domestic market, burgeoning 
macro-economy, educated population seeking employment, and rapidly developing 
infrastructure designed for commerce. To wit, this should be ideal for the foreign direct 
investor. 
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 Issues with FDI may then be reserved for the first two criteria of Figure 1. Indeed, 
the consensus for several analysist and media outlets was captured in a story by The 
Financial Times: “Cairo has insisted that it is committed to improving the atmosphere for 
the private sector, but diplomats and businessmen voice concerns about the widening 
involvement of the state in the form of the military and security agencies in the economy” 
(Saleh, 2019). 
 For context, the Egyptian military has aggrandized in economic affairs following 
2013 and now spearheads the new the phase of state-led capitalism: “the bonanza of 
economic opportunity that opened up after 2013 has sharply enhanced the military’s gate-
keeping role and rent-seeking activities” (Sayigh, 2019). This is most evident in President 
al-Sisi’s awarding of mega-project assignments to the defense establishment (Sayigh, 
2019); for example, the military own 51 percent of the firm responsible for developing the 
$45 billion capital city (Reuters, 2018). 
 Moreover, the Egyptian military owns dozens of businesses in various economic 
sectors (Rueters, 2018). It is unclear how much of the economy is under the control of 
Egyptian defense administrations (Meighan, 2018). However, it is known that military 
agencies participate—and often dominate—a wide range of industries including, 
“intervening in domestic supply chains and import markets, …foraying into lucrative 
sectors such as mobile telephones and internet provision, media broadcasting and 
production, and quarrying and mining” (Sayigh, 2019).  
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 One western diplomat illustrated an investor’s dilemma in competing with the 
military by pointing to Egypt’s debilitated cement sector, “which was already oversupplied 
before military plants brought in extra capacity last year by launching the largest cement 
factory in the country” (Saleh, 2019). Analogous wariness across sectors was recorded by 
various would-be foreign direct investors; “…Foreign investors [are] reluctant to invest in 
sectors where the military is expanding or in one they might enter, worried that competing 
against the military with its special privileges could expose their investment to risk” 
(Reuters, 2018). 
 Moreover, it is unlikely that the military will cede their economic footholds in the 
near future (Sayigh, 2019).  To the contrary, under the provisions taken by the IMF in the 
loan agreement, the military secured tax exemptions on goods, equipment, machinery, 
services and raw materials for purposes of national security—with right to decide which 
goods and services qualify for exemption resting with The Ministry of Defense (Reuters, 
2018). 
 Military involvement in the economy in this way not only depresses FDI inflow, 
but also deters job creation and national debt reduction (Saleh, 2019). Moreover, the state 
as the primary investor in the mega-projects and new commercial assignments—the 
majority of contracts of which have been awarded to the military—have “[drawn] scarce 
capital away from other parts of the economy…[and] have accelerated competitive rent-
seeking” (Sayigh, 2019).   
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 Countering, the GoE insists that private enterprises “are operating on an even 
playing field and that the military is filling gaps in the market” (Reuters, 2018). Yet, 
President al-Sisi admitted his bias for the military by claiming that they complete sizeable 
and complicated projects more quickly than the private sector (Reuters, 2018). It is clear 
that the status of the military as the most favored contractor is and will continue to stifle 
private sector investment—both foreign and domestic. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPERICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 To research how Egypt can attract, retain, and extract the best benefits from FDI, it 
is helpful to juxtapose Egypt’s economy with analogous economies that have differing FDI 
outcomes. In this way, studying other countries may reveal policy strategies and 
mechanisms that are effective—and relatively ineffective—for optimizing FDI. The 
conclusions of this case can then be used to inform a set of policy recommendations for 
Egypt. 
3.1 Methodology 
  
Egypt’s reforms have signaled that the country values FDI and is actively pursuing 
policy adjustments to attract foreign direct investors. As previously discussed, these policy 
adjustments have not yet produced the level of FDI Egypt wants to and expects to attract. 
Chapter two evaluated the conditions of Egypt’s FDI pull factors and appraised its policy 
and economic environment.  
 To further dissect causes and inform a specific policy recommendation, 
comparative research can be employed. This thesis uses an elementary application of the 
‘Most Similar Systems Design’ (MSSD) for case selection criteria: comparing similar cases 
but only varying the dependent variable. The assumption is that selecting cases in this way 
allows for a more facile method of identifying the independent variables that explain the 
presence or absence of the dependent variable.  
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In the context of this analysis, the dependent variable is the relative success of FDI 
attraction, while the independent variables are policy instruments. In this way, an ideal 
country for case comparisons would share many similarities with Egypt but would differ 
in terms of policy—where the most salient policy differences can then be identified and 
analyzed. 
To this end, this thesis will compare Egypt to two contemporary economies that 
share critical similarities in terms of economic output but vary in dimensions of policy and 
FDI output. To hold the maximum number of alternative factors constant, economies that 
share a common market and region ought to be chosen. A political and economic union, 
such as the European Union (EU), satisfies this requirement. Specifically, the two countries 
of study were selected from the EU because those countries share many legal frameworks 
and regulatory standards, but maintain niche policy variance.  
 To ensure policy diversity in terms of FDI, a prerequisite for country selection was 
that the country actively and publicly pursues of high-quality FDI. Therefore, a shortlist of 
countries was compiled from EU countries who advertise to attract FDI—informed by the 
OECD’s “Government Strategies to Attract R&D-Intensive FDI” (Guimón, 2008). 
 From this shortlist, optimal cases could be selected by identifying the countries with 
economies most similar to Egypt’s and establishing some FDI policy variation or strategy 
difference between the two selected countries. Of the countries on the shortlist, the Czech 
Republic and Portugal share the most economic commonalities with Egypt: namely, a 
similar nominal GDP global ranking. However, these two countries are not perfectly 
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analogous to Egypt beyond GDP, and, therefore, notable differences will also be 
highlighted in this chapter. 
 Operating on the assumption that Egypt is similar enough to the Czech Republic 
and Portugal, the dependent variables can begin to be compared to ensure compliance with 
the MSSD selection criteria. Table 2 outlines the relevant factors. 
Table 2. 
Comparisons to determine relative success of FDI 
 Egypt Czech Republic Portugal 
 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 
Nominal GDP Global Rank 45 43 48 44 47 47 
Stock of FDI Global Rank - 44 - 35 - 33 
FDI Inward Flow (millions) 7,409 6,798 9,522 9,479 6,946 4,895 
FDI Stock 109,677 116,385 155,994 155,024 143,637 135,777 
Number of Greenfield 
Investments  
93 91 110 132 92 130 
       
 
Note. Data for Stock of FDI Rank was retrieved from CIA, “The World 
Factbook” (n.d.); Data for GDP Rank was retrieved from The World Bank, 
“Indicator” (n.d.); and all other data was retrieved from UNCTAD, “World 
Investment Report” (2019). 
 
 With respect to the FDI figures listed in Table 2, it is evident that although Egypt 
has a comparable economy to the Czech Republic and Portugal, it severely lags both 
countries in all indicators of FDI inflow. Because of this, within the methodological 
framework, Egypt can be classified as relatively unsuccessful, whereas the Czech Republic 
and Portugal can be classified as relative successes in terms of the dependent variable. 
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 In short, the Czech Republic and Portugal are good economies to study because 
they have critical similarities to Egypt and certain policies are held constant between them, 
by virtue of EU membership, which allows for a nuanced focus of their policy differences. 
 Thus, investigating the comparative policy environment of the three countries 
ought to reveal the independent variables—in this case, the FDI attracting policies—that 
most effect FDI outcomes. To this end, it is useful to identify the spectrum of FDI policies 
available to any country—as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3. 
Policies and Factors affecting inward FDI  
 
Note. Retrieved from OECD, “Government Policies towards Inward Foreign 
Direct Investment in Developing Countries” (p.4), te Velde, 2001. 
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The breakdown of policies and factors related to FDI attraction in Table 3 is 
exhaustive. For the purposes of a comparative policy case study, column one—Industrial 
Policies—and column two—Macro-economic Policies—are particularly useful because 
the degree to which a host-country can influence these variables is far greater than factors 
listed in column 3 (te Velde, 2001). 
Moreover, the variables identified by Table 3 can further be distilled by applying 
the prioritization structure of Figure 1: “Results of The World Bank’s Survey of 
Multinational Investors and Corporate Executives- Importance of Country 
Characteristics.” That is, discussion of the respective policy environments of Egypt, the 
Czech Republic, and Portugal, can be limited to and categorized by the factors that foreign 
direct investors are most sensitive to.  
For example, Table 3 column 1’s “Efficient administrative procedures and rules on 
ownerships” can be discussed in Figure 1’s category “Legal and Regulatory Environment.” 
This categorization is particularly useful because it helps identify the independent variables 
(Policies) that produce the greatest effect on the dependent variable (FDI success). 
3.2 Empirical Case Study One: Czech Republic 
  
The monetary and fiscal history of the Czech Republic draws many parallels with 
the recent economic developments in Egypt. Today, the Czech Republic is classified as a 
developed economy, boasting a nominal GDP comparable to that of Egypt (World Bank 
Indicator, 2019), with a labor force 80 percent smaller than Egypt’s (Index Mundi, n.d.). 
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Moreover, the Czech Republic’s success at attracting FDI in Eastern and Central Europe is 
only second to Poland (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2019). 
 However, near the beginning of the century, the investment climate of the Czech 
Republic was far more analogous to contemporary Egypt. The 1997 financial collapse 
derailed the Czech Republic’s prior economic momentum that had stemmed from mass 
privatization and large influxes of foreign capital in the post-communism era (IMF, “The 
IMF and the Transition from Central Planning”, 2012). As a result, the Czech Republic 
was forced engage in macro-economic reforms similar to those taken by Egypt—as 
discussed in chapter two. For example, the formerly pegged currency was forced into a 
floating regime, and austerity packages were adopted to restructure state spending (Hauner 
& Auty, 2020). 
 The subsequent policy developments over the next two decades catapulted the 
Czech Republic into becoming the fastest growing economy in the EU and, consequently, 
an attractive market for FDI (Hauner & Auty, 2020). Policy evolution in the Czech 
Republic can be directly evaluated against contemporary Egypt, with a specific focus on 
the policies most relevant to foreign investors: characteristics in Figure 1 in which 
“critically important” and “important” exceed 50 percent. 
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3.2.1 Political Stability and Security 
To determine the most salient political factors that affect the relative success of 
FDI, it useful to identify the political risks to which foreign investors are most receptive. 
Figure 3, outlines those risks using data from the same survey used to compile Figure 1. 
Figure 3. 
The Prevalent Political Risks that Discourage FDI 
 
Note. Retrieved from The World Bank, “How Developing Countries Can Get the 
Most Out of Direct Investment” (p 8), Kusek & Silvia, 2017. 
  
 “Lack of transparency…”, “Delays…”, and “Breach of contract…” in table above, 
can be mostly captured by a country’s Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) rank and the Heritage Foundation’s Government Integrity Index 
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(GII) Score. Egypt’s CPI rank is 105 out of 180 to the Czech Republic’s 38, where a lower 
rank corresponds to less governmental corruption and greater transparency. Similarly, 
Egypt’s GII of 34.0 (out of 100 possible) is significantly lower than the Czech Republic’s 
score of 64.2, indicating to investors that Egypt is the more likely of the two countries to 
breach a contract. 
 Item two of Figure 3, “Sudden Change in the law…” can be discussed in the context 
of the respective countries’ legislative processes. The CIA’s 2019 Investment Climate 
Statements (ICS) for both countries outline each states’ law-making procedures for would-
be foreign investors. Again, the juxtaposition between the two countries is stark. The ICS 
(2019) credits Egypt with political reforms aimed at increasing transparency; however, it 
warns that, in practice, public consultation is limited. Whereas, the ICS (2019) for the 
Czech Republic paints a more favorable position for a foreign direct investor: in the Czech 
Republic “opportunities for prior consultation on pending regulations exist, and all 
interested parties, including foreign entities, can participate.” 
 Moreover, prior issues related to currency transfer and conversion—item four in 
Figure 3—in Egypt were discussed in chapter two. However, the ICS for Egypt highlights 
the efficacy of Egypt’s reforms. It states that, “by 2017 most firms operating in Egypt 
reported having little difficulty obtaining hard currency for business purposes, such as 
importing inputs and repatriating profits” (ICS Egypt, 2019). Likewise, though the Czech 
Republic does not use the Euro, the floating CZK is convertible to all currencies (ICS 
Czech Republic, 2019).  
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 Finally, item five of Figure 3, “Expropriation,” is also answered by the ICS: 
concluding that the risk is low in both countries. In fact, Egypt’s Investment Incentive’s 
Law and its Bilateral Investment Treaties guarantee against nationalization, confiscation, 
seizures, requisition, blocking, sequestration, and expropriation (ICS Egypt, 2019). 
 Other important political-risk criteria not covered by the table include the bias 
towards State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) and the risk of political violence. As discussed in 
chapter two, the risk of the former in Egypt is substantial. Recall, firms avoid market entry 
if the Egyptian military has operations or plans to have operations in a specific industry. In 
this respect, the Czech Republic holds a distinct advantage for a foreign direct investors. 
Legislation in the Czech Republic—Act No. 159/2006 on Conflicts of Interest and Act No. 
14/2017—limit political influence on the public administration of SOEs and allow private 
enterprises to compete with SOEs  “under the same terms and conditions with respect to 
access to markets, credit, government contracts and other business operations” (ICS Czech 
Republic, 2019).   
 Lastly, in comparison to the Czech Republic, the risk of political violence is higher 
in Egypt. The relatively recent Arab Spring and ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood are not 
long forgotten by foreign investors (Ellyatt, 2018). More recently, President Al-Sisi has 
drawn widespread criticism for his crackdowns, repression of the media, accusations of 
human rights violations, and arrests of his political opponents (Ellyatt, 2018). 
 In sum, this analysis implies that while Egypt is headed in the correct direction in 
terms of investor perceptions of political stability, it could improve its attraction of FDI by 
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emulating several policy measures of the Czech Republic: introducing a public consultation 
period in its legislative process, increasing firms’ ability to compete with SOEs, and 
decreasing perceptions of political violence. In turn, this may lead to marked improvements 
in Egypt’s CPI and GII ranks, which inform foreign investors’ decisions. 
3.2.2 Legal and Regulatory Environment 
 Similar to political security and stability, the legal and regulatory environment has 
measured determinates that effect not only a countries ability to attract FDI, but also to 
retain it. Legal environments vary from country to country. Thus, there is no objective list 
of determinants valued by foreign direct investors, but indicators valued by investors—
such as restrictions, discriminations, and regulations—can be examined to estimate a sense 
of the overall environment as it relates to FDI. 
 For example, legal restrictions placed on foreign firms for entry into specific sectors 
and industries reflect a host-economies attitudes towards FDI and are primary indicators 
for a would-be foreign direct investor. Protectionist restrictions could be a barrier for entry 
or may be perceived as an obstacle for expansion by an MNC. The protectionist attitudes 
of a country can be captured by the OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (RRI), 
in which a country is ranked on scale from zero (open) to one (closed) by evaluating 22 
economic sectors of a country. 
 The Czech Republic is considerably less restrictive than Egypt. In 2018—the latest 
data collected—the Czech Republic’s RRI was 0.1 compared to Egypt’s RRI of 0.9. This 
difference is significant because “reforms [liberalizing] FDI restrictions by about 10% as 
46 
 
measured by the Index could increase bilateral FDI in stocks by 2.1% on average” (Misturai 
& Roulet, 2019). 
 In practice as well, the Czech Republic seems substantially less restrictive than 
Egypt. That is, Egypt has many sector-specific limitations on FDI, including “restrictions 
on foreign shareholding of companies owning lands in the Sinai Peninsula,” requiring 
companies “wishing to register in the Import Registry to be 51 percent owned and managed 
by Egyptians,” and requiring JVs for investment in hydrocarbon and real-estate (ICS 
Egypt, 2019; Santander, 2020). Additionally, as previously discussed in chapter two, Egypt 
restricted FDI on several of its recent mega-projects.  
 In contrast, “there are few restrictions on foreign investment [in the Czech 
Republic] except in certain sectors that require access to sensitive information” (ICS Czech 
Republic, 2019).  
 In addition to restrictions, discrimination and bias, which effect a foreign firm’s 
ability to compete with domestic firms or firms from preference countries, can impede FDI 
inflow into a host-economy. Neither the Czech Republic nor Egypt discriminate in regard 
to the origin of FDI (ICS Czech Republic, 2019; ICS Egypt, 2019).  
Furthermore, in the Czech Republic, “foreign individuals or entities can operate a 
business under the same conditions as Czechs” (ICS Czech Republic, 2019). Similarly, 
barring some exceptions, codified policy in Egypt also tends not to discriminate between 
foreign and domestic entities (ICS Egypt, 2019). However, foreign firms are subjected to 
more scrutiny, which some firms describe as arduous and arbitrary (ICS Egypt, 2019). 
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 To foster competition, both countries do employ a completion regulator. In Egypt’s 
case, the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) is tasked with safeguarding against 
cartels, abuses of dominance, and vertical restraints; Czech Republic’s Office for the 
Protection of Competition (UOHS) performs a similar operation (ICS Egypt, 2019; ICS 
Czech Republic, 2019). 
 Another significant aspect of the legal and regulatory environment is the 
enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Numerous empirical studies show that 
increasing “IPR protection promotes both innovation and FDI” (Tanaka & Iwaisako, 
2014); which is specifically significant for attracting the quality FDI that both Egypt and 
the Czech Republic would like to attract. 
 However, while both countries do have substantial IPR protections, Egypt’s 
enforcement of relevant laws and regulations is viewed as sub-par for investors (ICS Egypt, 
2019). In spite of dedicated courts, institutions, and laws governing IPR, Egypt has 
remained on the United States’ Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report, which 
enumerates US trading partners that “do not adequately or effectively protect and enforce 
[IPR]” (USTR, 2019). 
 Lastly, the legal and regulatory environment of both countries can be captured by 
the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business Index” rank—a holistic review of countries 
covering indicators previously discussed as well as other significant benchmarks. Egypt’s 
rank of 120 to the Czech Republic’s rank of 35 (World Bank Doing Business, 2019), 
reflects many of the differences in determinates discussed thus far. Numerous studies have 
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established a positive relationship between improvement in Doing Business scores and FDI 
inflow (Malik & Jyoti, 2018).  
 The comparison of Egypt and the Czech Republic in this section highlights key 
differences that may explain the variance in FDI outcomes between the two countries. That 
is, for Egypt to increase its FDI inflow it ought to decrease its RRI by liberalizing FDI 
restrictions and increase the enforcement of its existing IPR laws while introducing new 
protections when possible. Consequently, changes in these policy areas may have a positive 
effect on Egypt’s Ease of Doing Business rank. 
 
3.2.3 Domestic Market and Macroeconomic Stability 
 Table 3 does not outline specific policy measures that countries can take to increase 
their domestic market size, and, therefore, there are no substantive independent variables 
to draw from this specific category.  
 However, an encompassing analysis of macroeconomic stability captures several 
controllables that investors are sensitive to. As discussed in chapter two, foreign direct 
investors are increasingly becoming assured of Egypt’s economic stability, but are 
generally worried about volatile inflation and high unemployment. Meanwhile foreign 
direct investors are markedly more confident in Czech Republic’s economy due to it high 
GDP growth rates and low unemployment (2.9 percent), but do worry that its “dependence 
on exports makes economic growth vulnerable to contractions in external demand” 
(Forbes, 2018). 
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 There is limited ubiquity in an index for economic stability. Instead, the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) can be used to score a country’s 
macroeconomic environments—though it does not explicitly reflect economic stability. An 
empirical study of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region compared to EU 
countries—in which both the Czech Republic and Egypt were included—found that “there 
is a direct relationship between Economic Freedom and the Inward Performance of FDI” 
for both the MENA countries and select EU countries (Caetano, 2009).  
Therefore, Egypt’s IEF score of 54.0 compared to the Czech Republic’s score of 
74.8—a closer score to 100 indicates more economic freedom—is a potentially significant 
elucidation for the disparity of FDI between the two countries. In this way, it would serve 
Egypt well to seek out policies that enhance its IEF. 
3.2.4 Labor 
 A majority of FDI ventures are dependent on the available talent and skill of labor 
in the host-economy. Chapter two outlined several labor challenges that Egypt faces in the 
status-quo: namely, severely high youth and female unemployment. With respect to would-
be employers, “concerns about the quality of the education [in Egypt] contribute to an 
increasing level of skills mismatch between formal education and the [labor] market” 
(International Labour Office [ILO], 2017). In terms of FDI, these concerns translate to a 
possible deterrent according to Figure 1. 
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 Several targeted “Active Labour Market Programmes” (ALMP) have emerged to 
address these concerns, but have largely remained ineffective due to several systematic 
challenges:  
These challenges primarily include the lack of a coherent policy and strategic 
framework, high levels of fragmentation between various public agencies and civil 
society groups, weak targeting, limited conceptual understanding of the multiple 
constraints young people face in the [labor] market, limited implementation 
capacity, lack of appropriate monitoring and evaluation, and a lack of [program] 
sustainability due to donor dependency, thereby leading to a lack of continuity and 
limited institutionalization of lessons learned (ILO, 2017). 
On the other hand, the challenges facing the labor market of the Czech Republic 
are similar, but for the opposite reasons. The Czech Republic boasts the lowest 
unemployment rate and is tied for the lowest labor market insecurity in the OECD (OECD 
Jobs Strategy, 2018). In fact, the Czech Republic is facing a labor shortage, which should 
translate to higher wages (OECD Jobs Strategy, 2018). However, wage growth has not 
manifested in the Czech Republic, and its low-income rate remains the lowest among 
OECD countries (OECD Jobs Strategy, 2018).  
Additionally, like Egypt, the OECD has recommended the need to enhance 
vocational training in the Czech Republic because “the [labor] market suffers from skills 
mismatch as the needs of the sizeable manufacturing sector does not correspond to student 
preferences” (OECD Jobs Strategy, 2018). In practice, however, the labor shortage has 
forced firms in the Czech Republic to seek less qualified employees and recruit workers 
from abroad—primarily from Ukraine (Czech Radio, 2019). 
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In this way, both the Czech Republic and Egypt are generally open to foreign 
workers as well. In fact, the Czech Republic recorded the highest rate of employment for 
non-EU citizens (Eurostat as cited in Kafkadesk, 2019). Meanwhile, “the Egyptian 
Companies Law does not set any limitation on the number of foreigners, neither as 
shareholders nor as managers or board members” (ICS Egypt, 2019). However, other 
investment reports indicate that, for staffing in Egypt, “a branch office may not employ 
more than 10% of its work force as foreigners or pay such foreign employees more than 
20% of the total payroll…” (Baker&Mckenzie, 2016). 
In this regard, the dissimilarity between Egypt and the Czech Republic does not 
yield any obvious conclusions for Egypt. 
3.2.5 Infrastructure 
Infrastructure needs of MNCs are largely specific to firms. Egypt’s infrastructure 
is viewed as relatively developed by investors (Baker&Mckenzie, 2016). With respect to 
transportation, sufficient roadways, waterways, ports, and airports exist for most 
investors—with the primary concern being congestion (Baker&Mckenzie, 2016). Several 
of the mega-projects discussed in chapter two have also aimed at improving Egypt’s 
transportation, logistical, and utility infrastructure. 
The Czech Republic, on the other hand, has made great strides at improving its own 
infrastructure. Ten years ago, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic 
noted that the country was severely lagging behind the EU average (Borufka, 2010). Today, 
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the country claims that the density of its transport networks place the country “among the 
world’s most advanced countries in terms of transport infrastructure” (CzechInvest, 2018). 
For a more objective comparison of Egypt and the Czech Republic, the World 
Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI)—a worldwide survey of global freight 
forwarders and express carriers—can be employed. When ranked against 160 countries, 
Egypt ranks 67th; markedly lower than the Czech Republic’s rank of 22 (World Bank 
International LPI, 2018). However, this ranking—like all previously discussed rankings—
is simply a snapshot of the status-quo and will likely not capture Egypt’s most recent 
improvements to its infrastructure. 
3.2.6 Tax Rates 
 The final criteria that meets the established threshold for importance for investors, 
is tax rate—although as mentioned in chapter one, it is a less significant determinant. 
Nonetheless, both the Czech Republic and Egypt have made recent updates to their tax 
code and collection methods to attract investors, reduce tax evasion, and increase their 
revenues; for example, the Czech Republic introduced an online tax reporting system to 
these ends (Forbes, 2018). 
 In regard to corporate tax rates, Egypt and the Czech Republic are relatively 
comparable, with the former maintaining a rate of 23 percent and the latter a rate of 19 
percent (ICS Egypt, 2019; ICS Czech Republic, 2019). This difference may not be highly 
significant because “it is not always clear that a tax reduction is required (or is able) to 
attract FDI” (OECD Policy Brief, 2008). 
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 However, for a myriad of political and economic reasons, investment incentives in 
the form of tax abatements and other tax programs are used to promote investment. Both 
Egypt and Czech Republic offer similar codified incentives but may offer more tailored 
incentives to specific firms. However, “numerous studies on incentives and tax policies in 
general find that incentives are rarely the main factor in shaping investment location or 
expansion decisions” (Jensen, 2016). 
 Therefore, both theoretically and practically tax policy should not be considered an 
immediate priority for reform. The analysis of the previous subsections have yield policy 
concerns that can and should be addressed much more immediately to attract FDI. 
3.3 Empirical Case Study Two: Portugal 
 
The use of a second country, such as Portugal, for comparison is useful for 
verification of policy determinates. For instance, if a policy advantage was identified to 
favor the Czech Republic over Egypt and a similar advantage is discovered for Portugal, 
then perhaps the policy in question is a significant independent variable. Alternatively, if a 
policy advantage was identified to favor the Czech Republic over Egypt but there is no 
advantage (or there is a disadvantage) in terms of policy outcomes, then it may be that 
independent variable is less significant. The opposite could also be true: an advantage 
against Egypt exists for Portugal but not the Czech Republic. Assuming this logic, case 
comparisons similar to those made for Czech Republic can also be made for Portugal.  
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Table 2 demonstrates that Portugal is reasonably similar to both Egypt and the 
Czech Republic. Moreover, Portugal shares many of the benefits of EU membership as the 
Czech Republic, which, as aforementioned, holds variables between the two cases constant. 
Directly compared to Egypt, Portugal has a lower nominal GDP, but higher GDP 
per capita with a population one tenth the size (Index Mundi, n.d.). As seen in Table 2, 
Portugal was overtaken by the Czech Republic in terms of nominal GDP rank. It is 
decidedly more successful than Egypt with regards to FDI attraction, but less successful 
than the Czech Republic. Overall, Portugal has a moderate inflow of FDI when compared 
globally, but it is remarkable as a country that has made significant improvements in FDI 
attraction over the last decade (Global Finance, 2018). 
As the Portuguese economy has navigated a slow and steady economic recovery in 
recent years, it may share more analogies with Egypt than the Czech Republic shared. 
Reforms and more favorable economic conditions since 2014 have contributed to the full 
economic recovery of Portugal (OECD Economic Survey, 2019). Through this recovery, 
like Egypt, Portugal was able to decrease its unemployment from over 17 percent to under 
7 percent (OECD Economic Survey, 2019). 
3.3.1 Political Stability and Security 
 The same variables derived from Figure 3 for prior comparisons of political 
stability and security are applicable to Portugal. For convenience, discussion in this section 
will emphasize similarities and dissimilarities in advantages with context, rather than the 
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specific outcomes for Portugal: outcomes are summarized below in Table 4 with relation 
to both Egypt and the Czech Republic. 
 Like the Czech Republic, Portugal has a considerably better CPI rank than Egypt—
and, in fact, has a better 2019 rank than the Czech Republic. A respectable rank of 30 out 
of 180 was achieved by Portugal to recent regulatory reforms in which the Public 
Prosecution Office “strengthened the collection and analysis of evidence to improve the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption investigations and the cooperation with audit and control 
bodies to improve the detection of graft” (European Commission as citied in OECD 
Economic Survey, 2019). 
 Because the Czech Republic and Portugal both hold a distinct advantage in regard 
to corruption and because perceptions of corruption are known to reduce FDI (OECD 
Economic Survey, 2019), it is likely that corruption policy is a significant determinant of 
FDI. This assertion is also supported by Portugal’s preferable GII score of 68.9, which is 
substantially higher than Egypt and marginally higher than the Czech Republic. Therefore, 
corruption policy should be featured in an overall FDI policy recommendation to Egypt. 
 Similarly, with respect to investors’ concerns of “sudden change in law…” Portugal 
too has specific preferable procedures, where Egyptian policy is deficient. That is, the 
Portuguese legal system welcomes FDI (ICS Portugal, 2019).  Specifically, all new 
regulations are subject to a 20 to 30 day public consultation period (ICS Portugal, 2019), 
akin to procedure in the Czech Republic. Again, the presence of an investor advantage for 
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both the Czech Republic and Portugal insinuates that a specific policy mechanism for 
Egypt may exist in regard to investor de-risking. 
 On the other hand, policies related to currency transfer and conversion need not be 
addressed because the currencies of all the three countries—Portugal’s official currency 
being the Euro—are perceived by investors to be fully convertible. The same logic is 
applicable to expropriation: there is limited risk for investors in all three countries. 
 Finally, barring the risk of political violence, the last investor advantage in terms 
of political stability and security shared by Portugal and the Czech Republic, but not Egypt, 
is limited bias towards SOEs. However, Portugal is not as evenly handed as the Czech 
Republic in this manner. Though both countries are largely in compliance with EU 
competition laws and the Portugal has laws of its own governing fair completion with SOEs 
(Law No.133/2013) like the Czech Republic, “SOEs [still] often receive preferential 
financing terms from private banks” (ICS Portugal, 2019).  
Although this bias is not necessarily preferable for a foreign investor, it is likely 
significantly preferable to the SOE situation in Egypt—discussed in chapter two. Thus, 
with consideration of the Czech Republic’s advantage, SOE regulation may be a significant 
policy area in which Egypt can improve upon. 
In sum, it was stated earlier that to improve FDI inflows Egypt should increase its 
CPI and GII rank. Portugal’s recent reforms to it Public Prosecution Office demonstrates a 
method to achieve those ends. Additionally, the specification of public consultation period 
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for legislation is a policy measure that Egypt could reasonably adopt, which could be 
perceived as a significant de-risking by investors. 
 
3.3.2 Legal and Regulatory Environment 
 Partially due to their common membership to the EU, there is less policy variance 
between the Czech Republic and Portugal in regard to the legal and regulatory 
environment. Thus, many of the relative advantages identified for the Czech Republic will 
also be true for Portugal. However, even if these sets of policies and outcomes are largely 
determined by a mutual regulatory environment as result of the EU, their validity as drivers 
of FDI is not necessarily diminished. In fact, justification for improvement of many of the 
legal and regulatory indictors was reasoned above—see Misturai & Roulet, 2019; Tanaka 
& Iwaisako, 2014; and Malik & Jyoti, 2018. 
 In brief, Portugal, relative to the Czech Republic, shares the same RRI, has a one 
rank difference in terms of “ease of doing business,” and does not discriminate between 
foreign and domestic firms or by FDI origin (OECD RRI, 2019; ICS Portugal, 2019); the 
notable advantages in this set being the index scores. Moreover, like both the Czech 
Republic and Egypt, Portugal employs a completion regulator: Autoridade da 
Concorrência (ICS Portugal, 2019). 
 However, the most notable policy recommendation with respect to the legal and 
regulatory environment, is likely related to IPR. Similar to the discussion above, while all 
three countries have codified IPR protections, the Czech Republic and Portugal are far 
better at enforcement: “Portugal is not listed in the [USTR] Special 301 Report, nor is it on 
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the Notorious Markets List” (ICS Portugal, 2019). The significant difference between the 
two countries and Egypt may be another plausible determinate that Egypt can influence via 
policy change. 
3.3.3 Domestic Market and Macroeconomic Stability 
 Again, addressing only the controllable variables investors are most sensitive to, 
Portugal shares several relative advantages over Egypt with the Czech Republic. For 
example, Portugal’s IEF score of 67.0 is considerably better than Egypt’s score (Heritage, 
2020), which will likely correlate with greater FDI (Caetano, 2009). 
 Also, the OECD announcement of a completed recovery of Portugal last year 
restored confidence in Portugal to some degree (Wise & Hall, 2019). There are likely many 
lessons for Egypt to learn from Portugal’s recovery—analysts are still debating causes of 
the recovery themselves (Wharton, 2018)—but, additionally, economists’ 
recommendations for contemporary Portugal may translate to Egypt as well—to be further 
discussed in chapter four. 
3.3.4 Labor 
 With respect to national circumstances regarding labor, Egypt is markedly more 
similar to Portugal than the Czech Republic. Using data from the same source, Egypt’s 
unemployment rate in 2019 was 11.29 percent, which is roughly what Portugal’s 
unemployment was in 2016—now lowered to 6.13 percent (Statista, 2019). Once again, 
policy recommendations for Egypt can be derived from both Portugal’s recovery as well 
as its ongoing and future operations; however, contemporary Portugal is far from ideal 
market for emulation. That is, concerns still remain about Portugal’s inflexibility of labor 
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regulations, low labor productivity, labor market segmentation, and brain-drain (Heritage, 
2020; ICS Portugal, 2019). 
 Nonetheless, Portugal’s substantial improvement merits some analysis that may be 
cross applied to Egypt. For instance, a preliminary assessment of labor market reforms 
from 2011-2015, parrots recommendations often cited for Egypt: continue to reform 
employment protection legislation; strengthen ALMPs; intervene to adjust wages (OECD 
Lisbon, 2017). 
 Specifically, with reference to ALMPs, Portugal has historically been more 
successful than Egypt—but, again, Portugal is not exemplary in execution. The efficacy of 
Portugal’s most recalibration to their ALMPs has yet to be fully studied, but guidelines 
recommend by the EU commission are applicable to Egypt and will be discussed in chapter 
four. 
 In any case, “there is a delay between the implementation of ALMPs and their 
effect on the [labor] market” (European Commission, 2017).  Be that as it may, Portugal 
created 6,100 jobs via FDI in 2018, with one in three international investors highlighting 
local labor skills and costs as very attractive (EY, 2019). 
3.3.5 Infrastructure 
 Comparative analysis for Portuguese versus Egyptian infrastructure will by and 
large be near-identical to analysis for the Czech Republic. As mentioned prior, the Czech 
Republic’s LPI rank was 22; whereas, Portugal’s is one rank lower (World Bank LPI, 
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2018). This is a negligible difference when contextualized with infrastructure’s relatively 
low priority in Figure 1. 
 For context, prior to substantial public investment—which was partially subsidized 
by the EU—substandard transportation and logistical infrastructure dampened Portugal’s 
economic development and ability to attract FDI (Live and Invest Oversees, n.d.). Today, 
however, 70 percent of investors find Portugal’s infrastructure attractive (EY, 2019). 
Furthermore, “estimation results suggest that public investment [in infrastructure] crowds 
in private investment and employment, and has a strong positive effect on output” (Pereira 
& Andraz, 2005), which may bode well for Egypt if it follows a similar path. 
 Specifically, the takeaway for Egypt is that their spending on mega-project is 
worthwhile. However, Egypt should be cognizant of policy measures that facilitate rather 
than deter the crowding in of private investment—especially, because that private 
investment could take the form of FDI. 
3.3.6 Tax Rates 
 Multiple tax reforms have made Portugal more attractive for investor’s overtime 
(Obiols, 2018), and investment incentives in innovation and research and development 
(R&D) have been successful in attracting new FDI (NordeTrade, 2020). However, 
Portugal’s corporate tax rate is only 2 percent lower than Egypt’s (ICS Portugal, 2019). 
Thus, attractiveness stemming from tax policy is likely a function of implementation rather 
than overall rate. 
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 In any case, it is likely that Portugal’s tax environment is not a primary contributor 
to its FDI attraction. When surveyed, more investors said Portugal’s corporation tax is “not 
at all attractive” than “very attractive”—13 percent versus 8 percent—with a plurality 
indicating “little attractive” (EY 2019). 
 This confirms the analysis comparing the tax environment of Egypt and the Czech 
Republic: that tax reforms and investment promotion is not a necessary determinant of FDI. 
3.4 Case Conclusions 
 As predicted by Figure 1, policy variance in the most sensitive categories for 
investors—political stability, regulatory environment, domestic market, macroeconomic 
stability, and labor—likely contribute the most to relative success of FDI attraction. 
Compared side-by-side in Table 4 below, Egypt’s policy deficiencies become clear when 
compared to the Czech Republic and Portugal. 
 This chapter demonstrates that index scores and ranks are important to the foreign 
direct investor, and that even marginal improvements can lead to favorable perceptions of 
an economy. Emulating the Czech Republic’s and Portugal’s policies that have empirically 
improved their rankings and scores—such as allowing for public consultation in the 
legislative process, increasing firms’ abilities to compete with SOEs, enforcing IPR, etc.—
can outline a path for Egypt to attract and retain a greater volume of FDI.  
 The independent variables identified with plausible significance can be translated 
to policy recommendations in chapter four. These recommendations can be policies the 
Czech Republic and Portugal empirically undertook to achieve the outcomes discussed in 
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this chapter, policy improvements recommended to the three countries by analysist, other 
empirically proven measures, or some permutation of each of these.  
Table 4.  
Summary of Policies and Outcomes 
Country 
Characteristic 
Controllables Egypt Czech Republic Portugal 
Political Stability 
and Security 
TI CPI 105 38 30 
 SOE Bias Common Limited 
Limited 
(Preferential 
Financing) 
 GII Score 34.0 64.2 68.9 
 
Risk of Political 
Violence 
Decreasing Low Low 
 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
Low Low Low 
 Legislative Process 
Limited Public 
Consultation 
Foreign Entity 
Participation 
Allowed 
Public Consultation 
Period 
Legal and 
Regulatory 
Environment 
FDI Restrictions 
Land-ownership, 
Import registry, 
and 
Hydrocarbons  
Only for National 
Security 
Electricity, Gas 
Manufacturing, Fuel 
Pipelines, Social 
Services, and 
Recruitment 
Services 
 OECD RRI .09 .01 .01 
 
Foreign/Domestic 
Discrimination 
Rare No Discrimination No Discrimination 
 FDI Origin Bias 
No 
Discrimination 
No Discrimination No Discrimination 
 
“Ease of Doing 
Business” 
120 35 34 
 IPR Enforcement Weakly Enforced Fully Enforced Fully Enforced 
 
Competition 
Regulator 
ECA UOHS 
Autoridade da 
Concorrência 
 
Use of 
International 
Accounting 
Standard 
Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic Market 
Targeted Industries 
for FDI 
Various 
Manufacturing, 
technology 
(R&D), and 
Various 
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business support 
centers 
Macroeconomic 
Stability 
Perceived Macro-
economic stability 
Near Stable Stable Stable 
 
Index of Economic 
Freedom Score 
54.0 74.8 67.0 
Labor 
Labor Market 
Program 
Inadequate N/A Multiple Initiatives 
 
Local Employment 
Quotas 
Less than 10% 
Foreign Labor 
None None 
Infrastructure LPI Rank 67 22 23 
Tax Rates 
Corporate Tax 
Rate 
23% 19% 21% 
 
Fiscal/Financial 
Incentives 
New Investments 
New and 
Expanding 
Investments 
Productive, R&D, 
and Job Creation 
Incentives 
Other Investment 
Promotion 
Investment 
Promotion Agency 
Investor Service 
Center 
CzechInvest AICEP 
 
FDI Guides 
Provided by… 
The General 
Authority for 
Investment and 
Free Zones 
The Ministry of 
Industry and 
Trade 
The Portuguese 
Agency for Foreign 
Investment and 
Commerce 
 
Time Required to 
Start a Business 
13 days 25 days 7 days 
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ARAB 
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT 
 
This chapter combines the theoretical research of chapter one, the review of the 
contemporary Egyptian economy from chapter two, and the empirical case analysis of 
chapter three to put forth a set of policy recommendations for the Arab Republic of Egypt. 
The goal of these policy recommendations is three fold: attract, retain, and extract the most 
benefits from FDI.  
As a brief overview, the main lessons from the previous chapters will be outlined, 
followed by an exploration of FDI opportunities from Egypt’s mega-projects, culminating 
in a set of tailored policy positions and a discussion of their potential implications. The two 
policy positions provide methods for enhancement of competition and labor, which were 
identified as critical pull factors in the previous chapters.  
4.1 Research Summary 
 
 
The previous three chapters of this paper determined FDI insights relevant to Egypt. 
Chapter one established the theoretical basis for FDI decision making by conducting a 
survey of scholarly research. The literature review of chapter one outlines the principles 
that are true of FDI in a general sense. That is, the findings in this chapter are considered 
universal, but an effort was made to identify the factors and conditions that are most 
relevant to Egypt.  
 Chapter two extracted insights from statistics and data related to Egypt’s macro- 
and micro-economy. It discussed relevant developments, such as the legacy of the IMF 
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reforms in Egypt, the countries grapplings with unemployment, and its goals with 
implementing mega-projects. This chapter is critical to understanding the specific 
opportunities in Egypt, the potential reasons for depressed FDI in its non-oil sectors, and 
the implications that increasing FDI could cause in the country. 
 Finally, chapter three used the empirical cases of the Czech Republic and Portugal 
to establish practical guidelines for FDI. The independent variables from the comparisons 
were identified and can be translated to policy recommendations in this chapters. 
 The table below summarizes the key findings for each chapter. The findings are 
categorized by their relation to FDI attraction, retention, or optimization—optimization in 
this context refers to a countries ability to maximize the benefits from FDI. Several of the 
findings for FDI attraction are applicable to FDI retention, and vice versa. 
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Table 5. 
Summary of Chapters: Key Findings and Lessons for FDI in Egypt 
Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Attraction 
- Firms FDI decisions can be 
explained by the OLI framework: 
they need an ownership, location, 
and internalization advantages 
(1.2) 
 
-Push/Pull factors explain why 
firms direct FDI towards certain 
countries (1.3) 
 
- Countries mostly control their 
pull factors to attract FDI (1.3) 
 
-Investment incentives are only 
effective when investors are 
irresolute between two 
comparable locations (1.3) 
 
- Firms are deterred from FDI by 
LCRs; high cost of market entry; 
restrictions; political, legal, and 
economic risk (1.4) 
 
 
- The EFF has boosted investor 
confidence and improved several 
pull factors (2.1 & 2.2) 
 
-FDI attraction is still weak among 
non-oil private sector and the 
current business environment will 
continue to depress non-oil FDI 
(2.2) 
 
-High unemployment may attract 
FDI interested in labor availability 
and low wages (2.3) 
 
-Investors are interested in 
participating in mega-project (2.4) 
 
-Mega-projects enhance the 
quality of Egypt’s infrastructure 
which investors are sensitive to 
(2.4) 
 
-FDI is unlikely in sectors in 
which the military operates or may 
operate in the future (2.5) 
-FDI attraction in Egypt is 
hindered by low performance with 
CPI and GII (3.2 & 3.3) 
 
-FDI attraction can be depressed 
when foreign firms perceive unfair 
competition with SOEs (3.2) 
 
-The risk of political violence in 
Egypt is perceived by investors 
(3.2) 
 
-Reforms that liberalize FDI 
restrictions significantly increase a 
country’s FDI stock (3.2) 
 
 -Egypt’s appearance on the 
Special 301 Report for IPR deters 
investors (3.2) 
 
-Investors perceive a mismatch 
between formal education and the 
labor market (3.2) 
 
-Tax incentives are not effective at 
attracting investment (3.3) 
 
-Egypt can emulate Portugal’s 
improved effectiveness of anti-
corruption investigations  (3.3) 
Retention 
-Investors are sensitive to 
push/pull factors even after 
engaging in FDI (1.3) 
 
- Firms will consolidate their 
corporate structure: Internalization 
Theory (1.4) 
-Current MNCs are increasing 
investment but sums are still 
modest (2.2) 
 
-Investors are threatened by 
competition with SOEs like the 
military (2.5) 
-Investors are satisfied with 
Egypt’s fully transferable currency 
and ability to repatriate profits 
(3.2) 
 
-Expropriation is not a significant 
fear in Egypt (3.2) 
 
-Sudden law change poses a risk 
to foreign investors (3.2) 
 
-Foreign firms feel they are 
subject to more arduous scrutiny 
than domestic firms (3.2) 
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Optimization (For Benefits) 
-Benefits from FDI include 
technology diffusion; human 
capital formation; international 
trade integration; increased 
domestic competition; 
mobilization of national savings; 
and improved 
environmental/social conditions in 
the host country (1.5) 
 
-Potential drawbacks include 
crowding out of local capital; 
reduction of capital; excessive 
completion; deregulation; and 
repatriation of profits (1.5) 
 
-Greenfield investments are the 
preferable form of FDI to 
maximize development (1.5)  
 
- Local firm managers who 
worked for MNCs are more 
successful and more productive 
than others (1.5) 
 
-Spillovers are the most salient 
benefit from FDI (1.6) 
 
-Vertical spillovers (from cherry-
picking, productivity shock, and 
improved performance) are more 
likely than Horizontal spillovers 
(1.6) 
 
-Spillovers are best in high 
technology sectors (1.6) 
-The confinement of FDI to only 
four industries decreases Egypt’s 
ability to extract benefits, such as 
spillover. (2.2) 
-Increasing ‘Economic Freedom’ 
can enhance the Inward 
Performance of FDI (3.2) 
 
-Egypt’s infrastructure 
improvements bode well with 
investors, but Egypt should 
facilitate the crowding in of 
private sector investment (3.3) 
 
 
  The remainder of this chapter will refer back to the lessons of this table to justify 
policy measures and recommendations. For convenience, the section in which the 
conclusions were arrived at, are given in parenthesis. 
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4.2 Mega-projects as a High-Technology FDI Opportunity 
 
 The objectives for FDI policy can be reasoned from Table 5. For example, policy 
recommendations should be aimed at attracting greenfield investment in high technology 
sectors over other modes of investment to extract the maximum benefits from FDI, as 
justified by Table 5. Additionally, all columns under the “attraction” section of the table 
indicate that enhancement of pull-factors—by de-risking, limiting the identified deterrents, 
liberalizing restrictions, etc.—are necessary to lure FDI. 
 Specifically, Egypt’s mega-projects—discussed in section 2.4—provide an ideal 
opportunity to enhance Egypt’s FDI attraction, retention, and optimization in the near- and 
long-term. The mega-projects are ideal because, as previously determined in section 3.3, 
infrastructure investment usually crowds in private investment, which can take the form of 
FDI, and, as discussed in section 2.4, investors are already interested in these project 
because they have been well advertised. Moreover, the mega-projects are associated with 
high-technology sectors, which are the most likely industries to experience positive 
spillovers, as determined in section 1.6. 
 Civil, Architectural, Mechanical, Electrical, Nuclear, and Construction are only 
some of the engineering sectors required for these mega-projects. Other high-technology 
sectors required to complete the mega-projects outlined in 2.4 include inter alia, 
telecommunications, information communication technology (ICT), data-processing, 
technical consulting, software, cyber-security, computer systems design, research and 
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development services, industrial manufacturing, survey services (such as geophysicists); 
MNCs are prevalent in all of the above fields. 
 It was established that the FDI attraction was a substantial objective of the mega-
projects, but that FDI inflows have not increased as expected. Analysis of section 1.3 
suggests that this depression of FDI is caused by insufficient pull factors. Therefore, to 
attract and retain high-technology FDI with respect to on-going and future mega-projects, 
Egypt should enhance its pull factors by adopting a small set of policy mechanisms and 
procedures; namely, a policy for competitive neutrality and to enhance labor. 
 There have been numerous other pull factor deficiencies identified in this paper. 
However, Egypt and the IMF have recognized shortcomings and have implemented 
policies—or at least recommended policies—to address those inadequacies, as evident by 
Table A1. For example, Egypt has recently worked to improve IPR protections as advised 
by international agencies, but what is needed is enforcement of its existing policies, as 
evident in section 3.2. Other issues that have been addressed to some degree include 
corruption perception, transparency, and economic freedom. 
 However, as seen in Table A1, competition and labor structural benchmarks set 
forth by the IMF are consistently “not met.” Moreover, policy recommendations from the 
IMF do not address the role of Egypt’s military in its economy—which was identified as a 
critical deterrent of FDI in section 2.5. 
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4.2.1 Policy for Competitive Neutrality 
 Although no formal policy measures were recommended or codified, the IMF did 
warn that military activity would stifle job creation and economic development (Reuters, 
2018). The IMF outlined more general structural benchmarks for competition as seen in 
Table A1, but as previously mentioned, Egypt was not successful in the implementation of 
these reforms. 
 The first notable failed reform was requiring Egypt to “publish a report on all state-
owned enterprises defined as enterprises where the state has a significant control through 
full, majority, or significant minority ownership” (IMF Country Report, 2019). These 
transparency measures would have addressed investor concerns regarding ignorance of the 
scale of the “military economy”: outside observers are unaware of how many industries the 
military is involved in. As discussed in section 2.5, foreign investors are warry of entering 
industries that the military is which the military operates or will operate. A public ledger 
would be a first step Egypt could take towards de-risking for foreign investors. 
 The second notable failed reform was to “approve executive regulations for the 
Government Procurement Law to standardize procurement rules… to encourage broad 
participation by the private sector, with a clear and robust framework for complaint 
resolution” (IMF Country Report, 2019). Successful implementation in this regard would 
have addressed foreign investors’ concerns about the military’s “most favored contractor” 
status. 
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 In the same vain, the final notable failed reform was the approval of a reform plan 
by the Prime Minister “to ensure that SOE’s procurement rules are consistent with the new 
Government Procurement law” (IMF Country Report, 2019). 
 The only IMF structural benchmark for competition that was met was the 
establishment of an e-Procurement portal. However, its efficacy is stifled by the venerated 
status of the military. 
 What needs to occur is 
the…[encouragement of] meaningful administrative and budgetary 
decentralization and, in the face of inevitable resistance from entrenched officer 
networks, [making] local government genuinely participatory and responsive to 
[citizens’] needs as a path to inclusive social development and to economic growth 
and diversification. (Sayigh, 2019). 
In practice, however, the converse is more likely: the GoE will continue to increase the 
privilege of the military at the expense of social profitability via investments in the mega-
projects (Sayigh, 2019). The above policies are realistic to implement and necessary, as 
evidenced by the competition policies of the Czech Republic and Portugal.  
However, Egypt’s mega-projects provide another opportunity, not yet discussed, in 
short- and medium-term. It is plausible that as Egypt awards procurement for future mega-
projects, certain projects can exclude the military and other SOEs from consideration—
especially in project that require high-technology labor. 
This scheme is realistic, because Egypt’s public goal of the mega-project was FDI 
attraction. Blocking SOEs from specific projects would allow for at least some FDI; 
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namely from investors who signaled that competition with the military was their primary 
and only deterrent from investment. 
Even a small increase in FDI resulting from these measures would be significant 
because: (a) targeting specific high-technology projects could potentially generate 
spillover effects; (b) limiting a projects to private enterprises encourages the formation of 
linkages that are necessary for spillover effects; (c) if these mega-projects are successful in 
attracting new investment, it is likely that profits from the investment will be re-invested 
into Egypt’s economy (World Bank Group, 2018). 
This scheme would be a successful short- and medium-term, but more drastic 
reforms to procurement procedures would be necessary to generate momentum in FDI 
attraction—including adoption of the failed IMF structural benchmarks. For fair 
competition in procurement, Egypt’s existing competition regulator could be given 
oversight responsibilities over the military and/or public procurement procedures (for 
developments like the mega-projects); however, as evidenced by prior failures, even a 
‘clerical’ reform such as this would require a great deal of political will and is unlikely. 
Another substantial, yet undiscussed reform, would be the restoration of VAT on 
goods, equipment, machinery, services, and raw materials for the military. Even the most 
competitive firms currently are not able to compete for procurement projects as a result of 
self-prescribed VAT exemptions by the military. The arrangement, codified in 2016 during 
the EFF, ought to be abolished or at least amended in an attempt to “level the playing field.” 
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Again, Egypt is unlikely to revoke these privileges on their own. The most likely 
scenario for these reforms to be considered would be if the IMF made them conditions for 
a stand-by arrangement. 
Thus, the policy conclusion for increasing completion, is the most obvious one: let 
firms compete. Because the conditions in the status-quo do not and will likely not create 
the necessary pull factors in the short-term to attract and retain FDI, Egypt can artificially 
induce that competition by limiting the engagement of the military and clearly defining 
projects. 
4.2.2 Policy to Enhance Labor 
 Alternatively or additionally, Egypt could seek to address its pull factor deficiencies 
by addressing investors’ concerns over labor.  As established in section 2.3 Egypt’s high 
unemployment rate is not necessarily a deterrent for FDI; however, as section 3.2 
concludes, investors may be deterred by a perceived mismatch between formal education 
and the labor market. 
 Section 3.3 found that when Portugal faced a similar issue, it resorted to ALMPs, 
which had variable success. Moreover, it was determined, in the same section, that Egypt 
has not had the same success with ALMPs, their primary challenges being improper 
targeting, limited institutional capacity, insufficient impact assessments, and inadequate 
coordination of stakeholders (Amer 2012; Angel-Urdinola et al., 2010; De Gobbi, 2005; 
Martin & Bardak. 2012; Semlali & Angel-Urdinola 2012, as cited in ILO, 2017). 
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 After assessing shortcomings with current programs, the ILO prescribed a set of 
policy recommendations in their 2017 report to reform ALMPs in Egypt: 
1. Reframe the employment promotion narrative from stand-alone measures and 
classic macro-economic frameworks towards job-rich, pro-employment policies 
2. Foster a narrative which [emphasizes] investments in young people 
3. Work towards a common understanding of ALMPs and improve their reputation 
4. Promote evidence-based programming (ILO, 2017)3 
The report fully outlines how to realistically implement these reforms in Egypt; however, 
“many policy makers and implementers lack an understanding of the importance of 
evaluation for [program] design and improvement” (ILO, 2017), and thus no reforms have 
been made public thus far. 
 Although the organization stresses the importance of the programs to address youth 
unemployment in Egypt, they do not frame ALMPs as a tool for FDI attraction. However, 
considering Moran’s (1998) policy advice—that policies which benefit domestic firms (i.e. 
investments in education and labor) are the same policies that lead FDI to positively impact 
development—ALMPs are a tool of FDI optimization in addition to being a tool for 
attraction. 
 Egypt’s mega-projects provide an ideal opportunity and excuse to implement the 
ILO’s policy recommendations. That is, the GoE and stakeholders could identify the 
                                                 
3 The full report can be found in Issue 4 of the ILOs Impact Report Series 2017 (ISBN: 9789221313106 
web pdf). This report justifies the selection of the four policy recommendations. 
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industries—preferably the high-technology industries—that are applicable to the mega-
projects, and design ALMPs specific to skills required for work in those sectors. 
 The combination of labor as a pull factor and investors’ existing interests in the 
mega-projects increases Egypt’s ability to entice investors in both the short- and long-term. 
Even if foreign investors do not turnout as a result of ALMPs, domestic firms—and even 
military industries—will have a greater qualified labor force; which may address some of 
Egypt’s systemic issues with employment. 
 If foreign firms do turnout, then the potential benefits are compounding. Recall, 
section 1.5 evidenced that local firms, whose managers worked for MNCs, were more 
successful and productive than other domestic firms. Other spillover effect via the 
movement of labor also become plausible under this scheme. The overall implication of 
ALMPs can be amplified in some ways through FDI, and may result in augmenting the 
employment rate in Egypt. 
 In sum, the policy recommendation for labor enhancement echoes the ILOs 
advice, but applies the context of Egypt’s mega-projects. ALMPs focused on the high-
technology sectors enumerated at the beginning of this section would be ideal to extract 
the best benefits from FDI. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis used several methods to establish the principles that lead to FDI 
attraction, retention, and optimization in Egypt. The evidence used to establish these 
principles justify the policy advice given.  
 The most significant lessons from the survey of theory in chapter one is that 
enhancing pull factors are key to lure FDI, that greenfield investments lead to the best 
development outcomes in countries similar to Egypt, and that FDI in high-technology 
sectors lead to substantial benefits across the economy. These findings were used validate 
Egyptian mega-projects as the subject of FDI reform. 
 Chapter two found that although the goal of the mega-projects was FDI attraction, 
Egypt failed to generate the investment it expected, due in large part to investor complaints 
of unfair competition with the military and SOEs. A policy for competitive neutrality was 
informed by this analysis and developed in chapter four as a result. 
 Empirical analysis in chapter three revealed a myriad of shortcomings that hinder 
Egypt’s FDI-seeking strategies. As evidenced by the legacy of the EFF reforms imposed 
by the IMF, Egypt has made strides in several of these areas. One area, identified by limited 
amelioration, was labor deficiencies. Consequently, chapter four outlined Active Labor 
Market Programs in high-technology sectors as a potential method of FDI attraction and 
optimization. 
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 The two policy options presented for competition and labor enhancement, can be 
mutually exclusive or administered in tandem. These recommendations are not exhaustive 
by any measure, but they do consider the idiosyncrasies of the Egyptian economy. That is 
not to say other countries in the region or countries in similar circumstance could not 
benefit from these policies as well. 
 At best, these policies have the ability to enhance economic development in Egypt 
and address its struggles with its micro-economy and unemployment. At worst, the benefits 
related to FDI do not manifest. Because the scope of this assessment is limited to high-
technology FDI related to mega-projects, usual risks to the host-country, such as domestic 
crowd out, are not especially relevant—especially because it was established the military 
economy already crowds out domestic firms in the status-quo.  
Generally, cost-benefit analysis is in favor of FDI. Future work and study ought to 
provide greater impact analysis of these policy recommendations. 
The significance of this work is related to it topicality. The policy recommendations 
in this work are the result of nuanced assessments of theory, data, and empirics. The 
recommendations stated are realistic and achievable by the Government of Egypt. 
  
78 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Chapter One 
Alfaro, L., Chanda, A., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., & Sayek, S. (2003). FDI Spillovers, Financial 
Markets, and Economic Development. IMF Working Paper, WP/03/186. 
Andrew Bloomenthal. (2019, May 13). The Three-Tiered Framework of Eclectic Paradigms. 
Investopedia. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/eclecticparadigm.asp 
Bayar, Y. (2017). Greenfield and Brownfield Investments and Economic Growth: Evidence 
from Central and Eastern European Union Countries. Naše Gospodarstvo/Our Economy, 
63(3), 19–26. https://doi.org/10.1515/ngoe-2017-0015 
Brownfield Investment—Definition, Advantages and Disadvantages. (n.d.). Corporate Finance 
Institute. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/strategy/brownfield-
investment/ 
Buckley, P. J. (2018). Internalisation Theory and Outward Direct Investment by Emerging 
Market Multinationals. Management International Review, 58(2), 195–224. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11575-017-0320-4 
Caves, R. E. (2007). Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (3rd ed.). Cambridge 
University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/multinational-enterprise-and-
economic-analysis/360FF700D9C3BA605E68F0EDE350D427 
Davidson, W. H., & McFetridge, D. G. (1985). Key Characteristics in the Choice of 
International Technology Transfer Mode. Journal of International Business Studies, 
16(2), 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490448 
Duarte, C. L., & García-Canal, E. (2004). The Choice Between Joint Ventures and 
Acquisitions in Foreign Direct Investments: The Role of Partial Acquisitions and 
Accrued Experience. Thunderbird International Business Review, 46(1), 39–58. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.10107 
Duce, M. (2003). Definitions of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): A methodological note. 
Banco de España, 16. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)—Overview, Benefits & Disadvantages. (n.d.). Corporate 
Finance Institute. Retrieved February 27, 2020, from 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/foreign-direct-
investment-fdi/ 
Görg, H. (2000). Analysing foreign market entry – The choice between Greenfield Investment 
and Acquisitions. Journal of Economic Studies, 27(3), 165–181. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000005350 
79 
 
Greenfield Investment—Definition, Advantages and Disadvantages. (n.d.). Corporate Finance 
Institute. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/strategy/greenfield-
investment/ 
Hausmann, R., & Fernández-Arias, E. (2000). Foreign Direct Investment: Good Cholesterol? 
46. 
How Developing Countries Can Get the Most Out of Direct Investment. (2017). [Text/HTML]. 
World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/competitiveness/publication/global-
investment-competitiveness-report 
Javorcik, B. S. (2005). Disentangling FDI Spillover Effects: What Do Firms Preceptions Tell 
Us? Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?, 46. 
Jensen, N. M., Biglaiser, G., Li, Q., Malesky, E., Pinto, P. M., Pinto, S. M., & Staats, J. L. 
(2012). Politics and Foreign Direct Investment. University of Michigan Press; JSTOR. 
https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.3425019 
Jeon, Y., Park, B. I., & Ghauri, P. N. (2013). Foreign direct investment spillover effects in 
China: Are they different across industries with different technological levels? China 
Economic Review, 26, 105–117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2013.05.001 
Lenaerts, K., & Merlevede, B. (2012). Horizontal or Backward? FDI Spillovers, Input-Output 
Tables, and Industry Aggregation. 
Local content requirements impact the global economy. (n.d.). OECD. Retrieved February 8, 
2020, from https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/local-content-requirements/ 
Mallampally, P., & Sauvant, K. P. (n.d.). Finance and Development. Finance and 
Development | F&D. Retrieved February 16, 2020, from 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/mallampa.htm 
Markusen, J. R. (1995). The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of 
International Trade. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(2), 169–189. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.9.2.169 
Maverick, J. B. (2019, November 24). What are the benefits and risks of greenfield 
investments? Investopedia. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/071315/what-are-
benefits-company-investing-greenfield-investment.asp 
Mohamed Amal. (2016). Chapter 2—Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Theoretical 
Approaches. 54. 
Moran, T. H. (2012). Foreign Direct Investment and Development. In The Wiley-Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Globalization. American Cancer Society. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog217 
80 
 
Moran, T. H. (1998). Foreign Direct Investment and Development: The New Policy Agenda 
for Developing Countries and Economies in Transition. BICEPS (Baltic International 
Centre for Economic Policy Studies) and SITE (Stockholm Institute of Transition 
Economics). 
Müller, T. (2007). Analyzing Modes of Foreign Entry: Greenfield Investment versus 
Acquisition. Review of International Economics, 15(1), 93–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00634.x 
Neary, P. (n.d.). World Economy FDI: The OLI Framework. University of Oxford and CEPR. 
Nocke, V., & Yeaple, S. (2008). An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 75(2), 529–557. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
937X.2008.00480.x 
Oatley, T. H. (2012). International political economy (5th ed). Longman. 
Odedokun, M. (2003). The ‘Pull’ and ‘Push’ Factors in North–South Private Capital Flows: 
Conceptual Issues and Empirical Estimates. World Institute for Development Economics 
Research, 234–270. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230524132_8 
OECD. (2002). Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising benefits, minimising 
costs. OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264199286-en 
OECD. (2018). Good Jobs for All in a Changing World of Work: The OECD Jobs Strategy. 
OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264308817-en 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Monetary Fund, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Group of Financial 
Statisticians, & SourceOECD (Online service) (Eds.). (2008). OECD benchmark 
definition of foreign direct investment (4. ed). Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. 
Qiu, L. D., & Wang, S. (2011). FDI Policy, Greenfield Investment and Cross-border Mergers. 
Review of International Economics, 19(5), 836–851. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9396.2011.00984.x 
Ramamurti, R. (2001). The Obsolescing ‘Bargaining Model’? MNC-Host Developing Country 
Relations Revisited. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(1), 23–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490936 
Rand, J. (1 C.E., November 30). Understanding FDI spillover mechanisms. Brookings. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/11/19/understanding-fdi-spillover-
mechanisms/ 
81 
 
Sari, D. W., Khalifah, N. A., & Suyanto, S. (2016). The spillover effects of foreign direct 
investment on the firms’ productivity performances. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 
46(2), 199–233. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123-016-0484-0 
Sauvant, K. P., Xavier-Oliveira, E., & Laplume, A. (2012). Columbia FDI Perspectives. Vale 
Columbia Center, 84. 
Segal, T. (2019, July 9). The Difference Between Greenfield vs. Brownfield Investments. 
Investopedia. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/043015/what-difference-
between-green-field-and-brown-field-investment.asp 
Stähler, F., Ryan, M., & Raff, H. (2007). The choice of market entry mode: Greenfield 
investment, M&A and joint venture. Kiel University, Department of Economics. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2008.02.006 
Strat, V. A., Davidescu (Alexandru), A., & Paul(Vass), A. M. (2015). FDI and The 
Unemployment - A Causality Analysis for the Latest EU Members. Procedia Economics 
and Finance, 23, 635–643. https://10.1016/s2212-5671(15)00448-7 
Tuovila, A. (2019, July 1). What Is a Capital Asset? Investopedia. 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalasset.asp 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2019). World Investment Report 
2019: Special Economic Zones. UN. https://doi.org/10.18356/8a8d05f9-en 
World Economic Situation and Prospects. (2019). United Nations. 
Zhou, N., & Guillen, M. F. (2016). Categorizing the Liability of Foreignness: Ownership, 
Location, and Internalization-Specific Dimensions. Global Strategy Journal, 6(4), 309–
329. https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1140 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Alaoui, M. E. (2018). Egypt’s mega projects. Flanders, 18. 
Awad, D. (2020, February 24). Contrary to expectations, Egypt rejects new IMF loan. Al-
Monitor. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/egypt-refuse-imf-
financing-technical-assistance.html 
Cellan-Jones, R. (2015, August 6). Egypt opens Suez Canal expansion. BBC News. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33800076 
82 
 
Din, A. S. E. (n.d.). Egypt’s Economy Isn’t Tanking. It’s Thriving. Foreign Policy. Retrieved 
March 25, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/26/egypts-economy-isnt-
tanking-its-thriving-sisi-muslim-brotherhood-imf/ 
Egypt: A Path Forward for Economic Prosperity. (2019, July 24). IMF News. 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/07/24/na072419-egypt-a-path-forward-for-
economic-prosperity 
Egypt army could play role in new Suez industrial hub: Chairman. (2015, February 26). 
Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-suezcanal-
idUSKBN0LU1AJ20150226 
Egypt Foreign Direct Investment | 2002-2019 Data | 2020-2022 Forecast | Historical. (n.d.). 
Trading Economics. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from 
https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/foreign-direct-investment 
Egypt is reforming its economy, but poverty is rising. (2019). The Economist. 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/08/08/egypt-is-reforming-its-
economy-but-poverty-is-rising 
Egypt’s economy thrills investors, but locals are struggling. (2019, April 25). The Economist. 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/04/25/egypts-economy-thrills-
investors-but-locals-are-struggling 
Egypt’s Mega Projects: Blueprints for Long-Term Growth. (2018). Embassy of Egypt 
Washington DC. 
Egypt’s Nasr Says Nation’s Politics Have Helped Business Environment. (2019, April 15). In 
Bloomberg TV. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-04-15/egypt-
s-nasr-says-nation-s-politics-have-helped-business-environment-video 
Egypt’s unemployment rate fell by 09% in 2019: CAPMAS. (2020, February 15). 
EgyptToday. http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/81654/Egypt-s-unemployment-rate-
fell-by-09-in-2019-CAPMAS 
Emam, A. (2019, May 26). Unemployment down in Egypt but maintaining trend is a 
challenge. Arab Weekly. https://thearabweekly.com/unemployment-down-egypt-
maintaining-trend-challenge 
Employment for Youth in Egypt (EYE): Working Together in Qalyoubia and Menoufia. (2016, 
December 1). [Project]. International Labor Organization. 
http://www.ilo.org/africa/technical-cooperation/WCMS_571875/lang--en/index.htm 
Females account for 75% of Egyptian unemployment. (2017, May 2). EgyptToday. 
http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/4561/Females-account-for-75-of-Egyptian-
unemployment 
83 
 
Foreign investment in Egypt. (2020). Santander Trade Markets. 
https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/establish-overseas/egypt/foreign-
investment?&actualiser_id_banque=oui&id_banque=18&memoriser_choix=memoriser 
Ghafar, A. A. (2016). Educated but Unemployed: The Challenge Facing Egypt’s Youth. 
Brookings Doha Center, 16. 
IMF expects Egypt economy to grow 5.9% in year to end of June. (2019, October 15). 
Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-economy-imf-idUSKBN1WU1TG 
IMF Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI). (2020, March 25). IMF. 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2017/07/25/policy-coordination-
instrument 
IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). (2020, March 27). IMF. 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/20/33/Stand-By-
Arrangement 
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept. (2019a). Arab Republic of 
Egypt: Fourth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund 
Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the 
Arab Republic of Egypt. IMF Staff Country Reports, 19(98), 1. 
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498306676.002 
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept. (2019b). Arab Republic of 
Egypt: Fifth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund 
Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the 
Arab Republic of Egypt. IMF Staff Country Reports, 19(311). 
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513516622.002 
Investment Trends Monitor. (2020). UNCTAD, 33, 8. 
Lagarde. (2016). IMF Executive Board Approves US$12 billion Extended Arrangement Under 
the Extended Fund Facility for Egypt. IMF. 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/11/11/PR16501-Egypt-Executive-Board-
Approves-12-billion-Extended-Arrangement 
Mega projects: A point of focus under Sisi rule. (2017, June 30). EgyptToday. 
http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/9300/Mega-projects-a-point-of-focus-under-Sisi-
rule 
Momani, B. (2018, January 30). Egypt’s IMF program: Assessing the political economy 
challenges. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/research/egypts-imf-program-
assessing-the-political-economy-challenges/ 
Overview World Bank in Egypt. (2020, May 1). [Text/HTML]. World Bank. 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/overview 
84 
 
Review Under The Extended Arrangement Under The Extended Fund Facility (18/213). 
(2018). International Monetary Fund. 
Saleh, H. (2019, August 27). Egypt’s economic turnround hailed by investors. 
https://www.ft.com/content/862f11ea-c4e9-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9 
Sami, A. (2018, June 27). Is Egypt’s new capital an untapped investment? The Investor. 
https://www.theinvestor.jll/news/egypt/others/egypts-new-capital-untapped-investment/ 
Sayigh, Y. (2019, November 18). Mapping the Formal Military Economy Part 2: We Build 
Egypt, We Feed Egypt, We Are Egypt - Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s 
Military Economy. Carnegie Middle East Center. https://carnegie-
mec.org/2019/11/18/mapping-formal-military-economy-part-2-we-build-egypt-we-feed-
egypt-we-are-egypt-pub-80335 
Sivabalan, S. (2019, November 27). Egyptian Companies’ Profits Surge as They Reap 
Benefits of Currency Float. Bloomberg.Com. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-27/egyptian-firms-reap-benefits-of-
currency-float-as-profits-surge 
Stevenson, T. (2019, August 6). Egypt and the IMF: Success or failure? Middle East Eye. 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-and-imf-success-or-failure 
Strat, V. A., Davidescu(Alexandru), A., & Paul(Vass), A. M. (2015). FDI and The 
Unemployment - A Causality Analysis for the Latest EU Members. Procedia Economics 
and Finance, 23, 635–643. doi: 10.1016/s2212-5671(15)00448-7 
Under Sisi, firms owned by Egypt’s military have flourished. (2018, May 16). Reuters. 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/egypt-economy-military/ 
Vio, E. (n.d.). Can Sisi turn around Egypt’s economy with mega projects? TRTWorld. 
Retrieved April 4, 2020, from https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/can-sisi-turn-around-
egypt-s-economy-with-mega-projects--18718 
What fuel, bread and water reveal about how Egypt is mismanaged. (2018, February 10). The 
Economist. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/02/10/what-fuel-
bread-and-water-reveal-about-how-egypt-is-mismanaged 
Youth Unemployment Rate for Egypt. (2020, April 10). Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSEGY 
 
  
85 
 
Chapter Three 
Barsoum, G. (2017). Youth-focused active labour market programmes in a constraining 
welfare regime: A qualitative reading of programmes in Egypt. International Journal of 
Social Welfare, 26(2), 168–176. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsw.12228 
Best Countries for Business: Czech Republic. (n.d.). Forbes. Retrieved April 28, 2020, from 
https://www.forbes.com/places/czech-republic/ 
Blazek, M., Zeman, Z., Carter, F., Hauner, M., Auty, R., & Osborne, R. (2020, May). Czech 
Republic—Economy. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Czech-
Republic 
Borufka, S. (2010, September 3). Czech Republic’s infrastructure is below the EU average. 
Radio Prague International. http://www.radio.cz/en/section/news/czech-republics-
infrastructure-is-below-the-eu-average 
Caetano, J., & Caleiro, A. (2009). Economic Freedom and Foreign Direct Investment: How 
Different are the MENA Countries from the EU. IBusiness, 01(02), 65–74. 
https://doi.org/10.4236/ib.2009.12010 
Corcoran, A., & Gillanders, R. (2015). Foreign direct investment and the ease of doing 
business. Review of World Economics, 151(1), 103–126. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-
014-0194-5 
Czech Republic Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption. 
(2020). Heritage. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/czechrepublic 
Ease of Doing Business Rankings. (n.d.). [Text/HTML]. World Bank. Retrieved April 28, 
2020, from https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings 
Egypt Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption. (2020). 
Heritage. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/egypt 
Egypt vs. Czech Republic—Country Comparison. (n.d.). Index Mundi. Retrieved April 27, 
2020, from https://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/egypt.czech-republic 
Egypt—Unemployment rate 2019. (n.d.). Statista. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/377343/unemployment-rate-in-egypt/ 
Ellyatt, H. (2018, July 5). Egypt repositions itself as a ‘global investment destination’ amid 
reform drive. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/05/egypt-re-positions-itself-as-a-
global-investment-destination-amid-re.html 
Employment of non-EU citizens highest in Czech Republic and Slovakia. (2019, May 31). 
Kafkadesk. https://kafkadesk.org/2019/05/31/employment-of-non-eu-citizens-highest-in-
czech-republic-and-slovakia/ 
86 
 
European Semester Thematic Factsheet: Active Labour Market Policies. (n.d.). European 
Commision, 13. 
EY Attractiveness Survey Portugal. (2019). Ernst & Young, 27. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Portugal—Investing. (2020). Nordea Trade Portal. 
https://www.nordeatrade.com/dk/explore-new-market/portugal/investment 
GDP (current US$). (n.d.). The World Bank Data. Retrieved April 11, 2020, from 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&most_recent_value
_desc=true&start=1960&year_high_desc=true 
Global Rankings 2018 | Logistics Performance Index. (2019). The World Bank. 
https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global?sort=asc&order=Infrastructure 
Gomes, J. (n.d.). Portugal’s Economic Recovery: The Impact of Ditching Austerity. Retrieved 
April 30, 2020, from https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/portugals-economic-
recovery-how-much-came-from-ditching-austerity/ 
Guimón, J. (2009). Government strategies to attract R&D-intensive FDI. The Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 34(4), 364–379. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-008-9091-1 
Infrastructure In Portugal | Portugal Infrastructure. (n.d.). Live and Invest Overseas. Retrieved 
May 2, 2020, from https://www.liveandinvestoverseas.com/country-
hub/portugal/infrastructure-in-portugal/ 
Infrastructure in the Czech Republic. (2018). Czech Invest. 
https://www.czechinvest.org/en/Doing-business-in-the-Czech-Republic/Infrastructure 
Jensen, N. M. (2017). Job creation and firm-specific location incentives. Journal of Public 
Policy, 37(1), 85–112. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X16000039 
Labour Market Reforms  in Portugal 2011-2015 A preliminary assessment. (2017, January 
19). 
Mistura, F., & Roulet, C. (2019). The determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Do statutory 
restrictions matter? OECD Working Papers on Internation Investment. 
https://doi.org/10.1787/641507ce-en 
Obiols, M. (2018, April 13). Global Finance Magazine—Top Countries For Foreign Direct 
Investment. Global Finance Magazine. https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/april-
2018/alchemy-fdi 
OECD. (2008). Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment: Recent Evidence and Policy 
Analysis. OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264038387-en 
OECD Economic Surveys Portugal. (2019). OECD. 
87 
 
OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. (2020, May). OECD Stats. 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=FDIINDEX# 
Pereira, A. M., & Andraz, J. M. (2005). Public Investment in Transportation Infrastructure and 
Economic Performance in Portugal. Review of Development Economics, 9(2), 177–196. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00271.x 
Portugal 2019 Economic Survey (2019). Retrieved April 29, 2020, from 
http://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Portugal-2019-economic-survey-overview.pdf 
Portugal Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption. (2020). 
Heritage. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/portugal 
Ruth Frankova. (2019, October 9). Czech companies struggling with labour shortage. Radio 
Prague International. http://www.radio.cz/en/section/business/czech-companies-
struggling-with-labour-shortage 
Seema Malik, & Jyoti. (2018). Ease of Doing Business and Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Review Paper. Pacific Business Review International, 10(12), 9. 
Tanaka, H., & Iwaisako, T. (2014). Intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment_ 
A welfare analysis. European Economic Review, 67, 107–124. 
https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.013 
te Velde, D. (2001). Government Policies Towards Inward Foreign Direct Investment in 
Developing Countries. OECD Development Centre, 34. 
The Death of Central Planning and the Birth of Markets. (n.d.). In The IMF and the Transition 
from Central Planning (pp. 255–286). 
The World Factbook. (n.d.). Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved April 25, 2020, from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank.html 
Towards Evidence-Based Active Labour Market Programmes in Egypt (No. 4; Impact Report 
Seried). (2017). International Labour Office. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2019). World Investment Report 
2019: Special Economic Zones. UN. https://doi.org/10.18356/8a8d05f9-en 
USTR Releases Annual Special 301 Report and Notorious Markets List. (2019, April 25). 
Office of the United States Trade Representative. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/april/ustr-releases-annual-special-301 
Wise, P., & Hall, B. (2019, April 10). Portugal: A European path out of austerity? 
https://www.ft.com/content/66fccb1a-515c-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294 
 
88 
 
Chapter Four 
Abul-Magd. (2015, November 19). Egypt’s Military Business: The Need for Change. Middle 
East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/egypts-military-business-need-change 
Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field between Public and Private 
Business. (n.d.). [Text]. Retrieved May 13, 2020, from 
http://www.oecd.ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/competitive-
neutrality_9789264178953-en 
Foreign Direct Investment: Putting it to Work in Developing Countries. (2007). USAID, 55–
66. 
Foreign Investor Perspective and Policy Implications (Global Investment Competitiveness, p. 
185). (2018). World Bank Group. 
Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018. (n.d.). 185. 
International Property Rights Index Egypt. (2019). Property Rights Alliance. 
http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/egypt 
Moran, T. H., Görg, H., Seric, A., & Krieger-Boden, C. (n.d.). Attracting quality foreign direct 
investment in developing countries. International Growth Center. 
https://www.theigc.org/blog/attracting-quality-foreign-direct-investment-developing-
countries/ 
Sayigh, Y. (2019). Conclusion: What’s At Stake? - Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of 
Egypt’s Military Economy. In Carnegie Middle East Center. Carnegie Middle East 
Center. https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/11/18/conclusion-what-s-at-stake-pub-80344 
staff, R. (2018, May 16). Under Sisi, firms owned by Egypt’s military have flourished. 
Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/egypt-economy-military/ 
Towards Evidence-Based Active Labour Market Programmes in Egypt (Impact Report Series, 
p. 64). (2017). International Labour Office. 
A-1 
 
APPENDIX A:  
Table A1. 
Egypt’s Prior Actions and Structural Benchmark 
                                     Egypt Structural Benchmarks: Fifth Review Under EFF  
Measure  Objective  Timing  Status  
The draft 2019/20 budget, consistent with the 
program understandings, to be approved by 
Parliament.  
Strengthen fiscal sustainability  Prior action  Met  
Issue and publish in the official gazette a 
Prime Ministerial decree to implement fuel 
price indexation mechanism for all fuel 
products except gasoline Octane 95 (a decree 
was already issued in December 2018), LPG 
and fuel oil used in bakeries and electricity 
generation.  
Eliminate fuel subsidies  Prior action   Met   
Increase fuel prices to raise price-to cost 
ratios to 100 percent.  MEFP ¶17  
Eliminate fuel subsidies  Prior action  Met  
Develop a plan for NIB. The plan will 
include modalities of: 1. coordination 
between the MoP, the MoF and the  
CBE; 2. liquidity and capital provision; 3. 
information sharing and data monitoring; and 
4. one-voice communication.  
Strengthen public finances and 
contain risks to the financial sector  
Prior action  Met  
CBE will not grant exemptions for 
commercial banks to breach net FX open 
position limits and apply sanctions to any 
banks that violate the limits, in accordance 
with the regulations.  MEFP ¶20  
Safeguard financial stability  Continuous structural  
benchmark  
Met  
Separate the regulatory authority for public 
transportation from the Ministry of 
Transportation by establishing the 
independent regulatory authority for 
transport.  MEFP ¶25  
Improve competition  March 31,  
2019  
Not met  
A committee comprising representatives of 
the ministries of Planning, Monitoring and 
Administrate Reform and Finance, and the 
CBE will review NIB’s operations and 
finances, and develop a plan, approved by the 
Prime Minister, with the revised mandate, the 
business model and the proposed financial 
structure of the entity going forward.  MEFP 
¶15  
Strengthen public finances and 
contain risks to the financial sector  
March 31,  
2019  
Not met.  
Pending 
assessment by 
international 
auditor.  
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Approve by Ministerial decree and publish 
new guidelines for industrial land allocation. 
The guidelines to include the following 
components: a) permissible use of land by  
investors for any industrial purposes with 
limited restrictions; b) market-based land 
allocation mechanisms that ensure open, 
transparent and competitive bidding process; 
c) clear eligibility criteria for bidders; d) 
simplified and standardized document 
requirements; and e) establishing an online 
platform and moving the entire process 
online, including all industrial land tender 
announcements, document and  bidding 
submissions, and reporting auction results. 
MEFP ¶25  
Improve access to land  March 31,  
2019  
Not met.   
  
Implemented 
by endMarch 
but  
not all 
industrial land 
will be 
allocated 
through price 
auctions  
Approve executive regulations for the 
Government Procurement Law to standardize 
procurement rules, procedures and document 
requirements to encourage broad 
participation by the private sector, with a 
clear and robust framework for complaint 
resolution. The procurement regulations to be 
applied consistently and uniformly to all 
government entities, including central and 
local authorities and economic authorities. 
MEFP ¶25   
Strengthen competition, optimize 
public spending and reduce 
corruption  
May 31, 2019  Not met. To be 
issued by 
Minister of 
Finance in the 
coming weeks 
after the State 
Council legal 
review.  
The e-Procurement portal will start operating. 
MEFP ¶25  
Strengthen competition, optimize 
public spending and reduce 
corruption  
May 31, 2019  Met  
Issue and publish in the official gazette a 
Prime Ministerial decree to implement fuel 
price indexation mechanism for all fuel 
products except gasoline Octane 95 (a decree 
was already issued in December 2018), LPG 
and fuel oil used in bakeries and electricity 
generation.  
Eliminate fuel subsidies  June 5, 2019  Not met. 
Implemented 
with delay on 
July 6,  
2019  
Increase fuel prices to raise price-tocost 
ratios to 100 percent.  MEFP ¶17  
Eliminate fuel subsidies  June 15, 2019  Not met. 
Implemented 
with delay on 
July 5,  
2019  
CBE FX deposits at foreign branches of the 
Egyptian banks eliminated.  
MEFP ¶8  
Improve foreign exchange reserve 
management  
June 15, 2019  Met  
Bring to market shares in at least four SOEs. 
MEFP ¶25  
Develop capital markets and reduce 
the role of the state  
June 15, 2019  Not met. 
Expected by 
end 2019  
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The Prime Minister to approve a reform plan 
to ensure that SOE’s procurement rules are 
consistent with the new Government 
Procurement law. MEFP ¶25  
  June 15, 2019  Not met. 
Implemented 
with delay in 
early July  
2019  
1/ The references to the MEFP reflect the MEFP from the fourth review. 
 
Note: Retrieved from IMF, “Fifth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the 
Extended Fund Facility,” (2019)  
